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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE
SEVELOFF FIX?
ANDY HARRINGTON*
ABSTRACT
This Article suggests that the Supreme Court has not deprived Alaska Native
Villages of a valid basis for claiming the authority to create and enforce their
own tribal alcohol regulations. Every federally recognized Alaskan Native
Village is situated in an area over which Congress extended the federal Indian
liquor laws in 1873, in an enactment Congress has never repealed; this should
logically empower Alaska Native Villages to exercise the same federallydelegated authority within their federal Indian liquor law Indian country as
lower-48 tribes have within their reservations or “dependent Indian
communities.” Since this delegated authority is shared with the states, this
postulate does not deprive the State of Alaska of any authority to enforce its
own liquor laws; liquor transactions must conform to both state law and
applicable tribal law.

INTRODUCTION
“Ways have to be found to provide communities with the power to create and
enforce their own tribal alcohol regulations, ones that originate from the will
of the people. Tribal authority, however, will not be feasible in light of the
[Venetie] Court decision denying Alaska Natives tribal authority.”1

Do Alaska Native Villages—as federally–recognized tribes—have
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any authority to enact their own ordinances concerning alcohol within
their communities? This question is significant because of the welldocumented deleterious effects alcohol abuse has had on Alaska’s
Native communities.2 There are several respects in which Alaska Native
villages might want to exercise alcohol authority beyond relying
exclusively on state enforcement of state and local option laws.3
This article posits that the answer is “yes”; Alaska Native Villages
can enact their own rules and impose their own sanctions for violations
of those rules. Such ordinances would not supplant, but rather
supplement, existing state and local option alcohol laws.
Part I reviews the argument that Alaska Native Villages lack such
authority. Part II surveys the federal Indian liquor laws and their
reformulation in 1953 away from their somewhat paternalistic origins
into a more empowering federal delegation of authority to states and
tribes. Part III analyzes how these laws were brought to Alaska,
including the 1873 “Seveloff fix” and subsequent developments. Lastly,
Part IV explores several implementation issues that could arise if, as this
article posits, each federally recognized tribe in Alaska has a valid claim
to occupying “Indian country” for purposes of the federal Indian liquor
laws, providing a sufficient basis for enactment of tribal alcohol
ordinances.

I.

THE ARGUMENT THAT ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES HAVE NO
ALCOHOL AUTHORITY

The ostensible barrier to recognizing federally-delegated intoxicant
authority in Alaska Native Villages is that they do not occupy “Indian
country” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151.4 The 1998 United States

2. Several of the many studies and statistics documenting the extent of
alcohol damage to Alaska Native Villages are well summarized in Ryan
Fortson’s simultaneously published article “Advancing Tribal Court Criminal
Jurisdiction in Alaska.” Ryan Fortson, Advancing Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction
in Alaska, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 94–100 (2015). This author is indebted to Mr.
Fortson for letting him cross-reference that article.
3. “Local option laws” are state statutes allowing Alaskan communities to
hold an election on prohibiting the importation, sale, and/or possession under a
specified menu of choices. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 04.11.491 (West 2014). Although
several Alaska Native Villages and municipalities have availed themselves of
this option, many have been “frustrated with the statute’s lack of effectiveness in
deterring alcohol importation and use,” and have tried to “adopt more assertive
means of enforcement.” Pat Hanley, Warrantless Searches for Alcohol by Native
Alaskan Villages: A Permissible Exercise of Sovereign Rights or an Assault on Civil
Liberties?, 14 Alaska L. Rev. 471, 472 (1997).
4. “Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the
term ‘Indian country’, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits
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Supreme Court ruling in Venetie v. State of Alaska5 held that former
reservation lands conveyed under the 1971 Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA)6 did not fall within this definition. Because
ANCSA had revoked Venetie’s reservation,7 and because there was no
argument that its lands were an “allotment,”8 the sole question was
whether it was a “dependent Indian community,” a phrase the Court
had not interpreted before. It held that “dependent Indian community”
lands would have to be set aside by the Federal Government for the use
of Indians as Indian land, and under federal superintendence.
Notwithstanding conveyance of those lands by the recipient ANCSA
Village Corporation to the corresponding governmental tribal council
for that village, the Court held that the set-aside and superintendence
requirements were not met, so the lands did not qualify as Indian
country over which the council could exercise taxation authority.
Post-Venetie, courts have recognized that Alaska Native Villages
retain inherent authority with respect to relations involving tribal
members even though they do not occupy “Indian country.”9 However,
the objectors note, this inherent authority framework cannot provide a
basis for alcohol authority, because the United States Supreme Court has
already stated that “Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent
power to regulate in this area,” in the 1983 decision in Rice v. Rehner.10
Tribes in the lower 48 are able to exercise alcohol authority because
they are tribes to which Congress has delegated some measure of federal
alcohol authority—but statutorily that delegation only has effect within
“Indian country.”11

of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rightsof-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.” 18
U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
5. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 532–34
(1998).
6. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h) (2012).
7. 43 U.S.C. § 1618 (2012) (revoking all Alaska reservations except
Metlakatla).
8. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527.
9. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 754 (Alaska 1999) (holding that Congress
intended for Alaska Native Villages to retain governmental powers whether or
not they occupy Indian country).
10. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 52–54.
11. Per federal statute:
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Thus, the objectors posit, Rice v. Rehner took away the tribes’
inherent authority, and Venetie took away the “Indian country” within
which the tribes’ federally-delegated authority might otherwise operate.
As a result, there is no basis upon which Alaska Native Villages outside
of Indian country can claim any authority over alcohol, whether
inherent or federally-delegated.
There may be more than one flaw to this syllogism, but the
particular component on which this article focuses starts with the fact
that “Indian country” for purposes of the federal Indian liquor laws
(“FILL” Indian country) is not the same as “Indian country” for general
purposes (“full” Indian country), which is what the Supreme Court was
interpreting in Venetie. The Indian commerce clause enables Congress to
designate particular lands as “Indian country” for general purposes, or
as “Indian country” for purposes solely of the federal Indian liquor
laws, or neither, or both. This has been clear since at least 1876:
In view of this changed condition, it would be strange, indeed,
if the commercial power, lodged solely with Congress and
unrestricted as it is by State lines, did not extend to the
exclusion of spirituous liquors intended to corrupt the Indians,
not only from existing Indian country, but from that which has
ceased to be so, by reason of its cession to the United States.
The power to define originally the ‘Indian country,’ within
which the unlicensed introduction and sale of liquors were
prohibited, necessarily includes that of enlarging the prohibited
boundaries, whenever, in the opinion of Congress, the interests
of Indian intercourse and trade will be best subserved.12
Indeed, the current United States Code contains more than one
definition of “Indian country.” In 1949, Congress prefaced the definition
of “Indian country” in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 by adding the clause, “Except as
otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title,” and those
sections are part of the current federal Indian liquor laws. In twin
passages in § 1154 and § 1156, Congress specified that “Indian country”
for purposes of those laws would be somewhat different, generally

The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669, of this title,
shall not apply within any area that is not Indian country, nor to any
act or transaction within any area of Indian country provided such act
or transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State in which
such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by
the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified
by the Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register.
18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012).
12. United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196 (1876).
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narrower than the § 1151 definition (by excluding “fee-patented lands in
non-Indian
communities
or
rights-of-way
through
Indian
13
reservations”), but with an exception if there was “a treaty or statute
extending the Indian liquor laws thereto.”14 Thus, § 1151 defers to § 1154
and § 1156 if “Indian country” is being considered for purposes of the
federal Indian liquor laws; but those two statutes in turn defer to a more
specific treaty or statute extending the Indian liquor laws to a particular
parcel of land if one exists, which can make that parcel “Indian country”
for purposes of the federal Indian liquor laws even though it may be feepatented land in a non-Indian community.
As such, the concept of “Indian country” is not as monolithic as the
above Rice v. Rehner/Venetie syllogism assumes it to be. A piece of land
might not be “Indian country” for purposes of allowing a tribe to
impose a tax as in Venetie, but nevertheless might be a piece of land to
which Congress has extended the Indian liquor laws.
It would be entirely feasible, then, for Congress to legislate an
extension of the Indian liquor laws to certain areas in Alaska and thus
give tribes the same authority over those areas as tribes in the lower 48
have currently.
And indeed Congress already has. The 1949 amendments were not
the first occasion on which Congress bifurcated the concept of general
Indian country from the concept of Indian country for purposes of
Indian liquor laws. Congress did so in 1873, in an Alaska-specific piece
of legislation this article refers to as the “Seveloff fix,” and it is the
backdrop and subsequent history surrounding this enactment which
needs to be analyzed.

II. THE FEDERAL INDIAN LIQUOR LAWS OVER TIME
To better understand the Alaska situation, it is necessary to
summarize the origins and development of the federal Indian liquor
laws.

13. In situations where the § 1154 definition excludes lands encompassed
within the § 1151 definition, it is appropriate to recognize tribal authority over
the broader swath of lands under the § 1151 definition. See City of Timber Lake
v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 1993) (“By the express
terms of §§ 1154(c), 1156, and 1151, the narrow definition of Indian country
contained in §§ 1154(c) and 1156 applies only to the reach of those federal
criminal liability statutes, and the broad definition in § 1151 applies to all other
sections in the chapter”). The case does not speak to a situation where, as this
article posits is the case in Alaska, the lands may fall outside the § 1151
definition, but fall within the exception in § 1154(c) because there is “a treaty or
statute extending the Indian liquor laws thereto.” 18 U.S.C. § 1154 (2012).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1154; 18 U.S.C. § 1156 (2012).
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Starting in colonial times and continuing through the birth of the
United States, laws existed to prohibit the conveyance of liquor to
Native Americans.15 The first such United States law was enacted in
1802 in response to a verbal plea from an Indian Chief to President
Jefferson.16 The most definitive and long-lived of these federal Indian
liquor laws were originally enacted as sections 20 and 21 of the 1834
Trade and Intercourse Act,17 the successors of which still remain in the
current United States Code.18
As originally enacted, both sections were limited to operating
within “Indian country,” which had a specific definition in section 1 of
the 1834 Act.19
Debates ensued as to whether territories the United States acquired
after 1834 were “west of the Mississippi and not within the States of
Missouri and Louisiana or the Territory or Arkansas” within the 1834
definition of “Indian country.” Typifying this was the case of United
States v. Tom,20 in which Mr. Tom was indicted in Oregon for violating
the liquor law provisions of the 1834 Act.21 Oregon had not been a
territory in 1834, thus presenting the after-acquired territory issue.22
15. Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 352 (1942).
16. Id.
17. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1154(a)). Section 20 made it a five hundred dollar offense to supply
liquor to an Indian within Indian country, and made it a three hundred dollar
offense to bring liquor into Indian country (except for military liquor supplies).
Id. Any liquor found could be destroyed by any person in the service of the
United States or by “any Indian,” and the individual’s other goods, boats,
packages, and peltries could be forfeited through a court action. Id. Section 21
prohibited distilleries within the limits of Indian country. Id.
18. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154 (“Intoxicants dispensed in Indian country”), 1156
(“Intoxicants dispensed unlawfully”), 3113 (2012) (“Liquor violations in Indian
country”), 3488 (2012) (“Intoxicating liquor in Indian country as evidence of
unlawful introduction”), 3669 (2012) (“Conveyances carrying liquor”); 25 U.S.C.
§ 251 (2012) (“Setting up distillery”); 25 U.S.C. § 253 (“Wines for sacramental
purposes”).
19. Which read:
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the States of Missouri and Louisiana or the Territory of
Arkansas, and also that part of the United States east of the Mississippi
river, and not within any State, to which the Indian title has not been
extinguished, shall, for the purposes of the act, be taken and deemed to
be the Indian country.
Act of June 30, 1834, § 1.
20. 1 Or. 26 (Or. 1853).
21. Id. at 26.
22. At the time of the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, Oregon was still
governed under an 1818 joint occupation agreement between the United States
and Britain. Id. at 27. Oregon did not become an American Territory until 1846,
some twelve years after the 1834 Act had been passed. L. Harris, History of the
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Further, an Oregon-specific Congressional Act in 1850 had extended the
1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act over the Territory of Oregon “so
far as [its provisions] may be applicable.”23 Thus, there were two issues:
whether the 1834 Act applied through its own terms, and whether it
applied through the 1850 Act.
The three justices wrote three separate opinions, but the other two
justices concurred in Chief Justice Williams’ statement that, “Oregon is
generally supposed to be a part of the Indian country named in the act
of Congress of June 30, 1834; but such is not the case.”24 They parted
ways on interpreting the “so far as may be applicable” clause in that
1850 Act; two decided that such language sufficed to make the liquor
law provisions of the 1834 Act applicable within Oregon, one that it did
not. Chief Justice Williams posited that the applicability of the Act
should be adjudged by the criterion “whatever militates against the true
interests of a white population is inapplicable,” but since sober Indians
were in the true interests of the white population, the liquor laws should
apply.25 Justice Olney rejected that test, instead asserting that the
question should be whether any of the provisions of the 1834 Act
conflicted with the rights which white men had been exercising prior to
1850, “thus making the rights of the whites under existing laws the test
of applicability,” and since white Oregonians had had the right of
unrestricted traffic with Indians prior to 1850, the 1850 enactment
should not override the white right to sell liquor to Indians.26 Justice
McFadden, called upon to cast the deciding vote, thought the test should
turn on actual conflicts with other laws;27 opining that the federal Indian
liquor law provisions were “well suited to the state of affairs here,” he
concluded that enforcement of the relevant provisions of the 1834 Act
“would not be in contravention of any act of Congress, or in conflict
with any of the laws of this territory,”28 and so agreed with the Chief
Justice that the 1850 Act made them enforceable.
Thus, although two of the three judges ruled that the 1850 Act
should make the 1834 Act applicable to criminalize the sale of liquor to
Indians in Oregon, all three agreed that the 1834 Act by itself did not
encompass the later-acquired Territory of Oregon.
That aspect of the Tom ruling was criticized in an opinion by thenUnited States Attorney General Caleb Cushing: “The terms of the act
Oregon Code, 1 OR. L. REV. 129, 130 (April 1922).
23. Act of June 5, 1850, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 437.
24. Tom, 1 Or. at 27.
25. Id. at 27.
26. Id. at 29 (Olney, J., concurring and dissenting).
27. Id. at 30 (McFadden, J., concurring and dissenting).
28. Id.
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are: ‘All that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the States of Missouri and Louisiana or the Territory of Arkansas,
and also that part of the United States east of the Mississippi river, and
not within any State, to which the Indian title has not been extinguished,
shall, for the purposes of the act, be taken and deemed to be the Indian
country.’ Why, I repeat, does not this description apply to Oregon with
mathematical precision of certainty? Is not Oregon a ‘part of the United
States, west of the Mississippi’?”29
In 1862, Congress partially mooted this question, by amending the
1834 Act so that certain liquor law provisions were applicable both
inside and outside Indian country.30 In subsequent cases, the United
States Supreme Court made it clear that the 1834 definition had
sufficient “adaptability” to extend to territories acquired after 1834,
undermining the principle premise of the Tom ruling.31 More
contemporary scholarship has indicated that the legislative history of
the 1834 Act reflected intent to cover lands of several tribes in the
Northwest.32 But as we shall see, the Tom case, whether correctly
decided or not, was to play a role in developments in Alaska.
If the definition of “Indian country” occasioned litigation during
the 1850’s, it became even more susceptible to arguments when it
disappeared. When Congress codified its first several decades of
legislation into the “Revised Statutes” of 1873,33 only certain parts of the
29. Indians in Oregon, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 295–96 (1855).
30. Prior to the amendment, section 20 forbade persons to “sell, exchange,
give, barter, or dispose of any spirituous liquor or wine to an Indian (in the
Indian country).” Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729. In the amendment, the
phrase “an Indian (in the Indian country)” was changed to “an Indian under the
charge of an Indian superintendent or agent appointed by the United States,” so
the crime of conveying liquor to an Indian no longer required a showing of
“Indian country.” Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 24, § 1, 12 Stat. 338–39. A separate
clause forbad persons to “introduce or attempt to introduce any spirituous
liquor or wine into the Indian country,” and that remained unchanged, so a
conviction for importation still contained Indian country as a required element.
Id.
31. See Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 207 (1877); see also Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556, 561 (1883) (“that definition now applies to all the country to which the
Indian title has not been extinguished within the limits of the United States, . . .
although much of it has been acquired since the passage of the act of 1834”).
32. Including the Walla Wallas, the Chinooks, and the Clackamus – the very
tribe the Tom decision indicated the 1834 Act did not cover. D. Niedermeyer,
“The True Interests of a White Population”: the Alaska Indian Country Decisions of
Judge Matthew P. Deady, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 195, 233–35 (1988).
33. The “Revised Statutes” was the first official codification of the laws in the
then-sixteen volumes of the United States Statutes at Large. Congress created a
commission to undertake the task in 1866. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat.
74. Upon receiving the commission’s work product, Congress appointed a
Congressional Committee to review the work and prepare a bill. Act of Mar. 3,
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1834 Trade and Intercourse Act were included in those Revised Statutes.
The federal Indian liquor laws (FILL), found in §§ 20 and 21 of the 1834
Act, became §§ 2139, 2140 and 2141 of the Revised Statutes. These
provisions still criminalized both importation of liquor into Indian
country and conveyance of liquor to an Indian inside or outside of
Indian country,34 furthermore maintaining a duty for any Indian within
Indian country to take and destroy any liquor.35
But the Revised Statutes omitted, and did not replace, the definition
of “Indian country” from § 1 of the 1834 Act.36 Still, several other
provisions of law in the Revised Statutes continued to reference “Indian
country,” making it necessary for the courts to determine which areas
were and were not encompassed. In the ensuing decades the courts
made their determinations as best they could, using the 1834 definition
as the starting point for those analyses, even though it was excluded
from the Revised Statutes.37
1873, ch. 241, 17 Stat. 579. The resulting “1873 Revised Statutes of the United
States” was published February 22, 1875; however, numerous errors surfaced,
leading to some corrections. See Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, § 3, 18 Stat. 316; Act
of Feb. 27, 1877, ch. 69, 19 Stat. 240. Eventually authorization was given for the
publication of a corrected version of the entire Revised Statutes, resulting in the
more accurate “Revised Statutes of 1878.” Congress subsequently amended the
1877 Act to specify that the 1878 Revised Statutes would only be “prima facie”
evidence of the law, which could be countered by reference directly to the
Statutes at Large. Act of Mar. 9, 1878, ch. 26, 20 Stat. 27.
34. Congress removed in 1862 the “Indian country” requirement from
section 20 of the 1834 Act. See supra note 30. The 1875 Revised Statutes § 2139
arguably may have put that back in, by adding “Every person, except an Indian,
in the Indian country, who sells, exchanges, gives, barters, or disposes of any
spirituous liquors or wine to any Indian under the charge of any Indian superintendent or agent . . .” But the corrections Congress enacted in 1877 removed the
clause “except an Indian, in the Indian country.” Act of Feb. 27, 1877, ch. 69, 19
Stat. 244.
35. Revised Statutes § 2140, ch. 26, 20 Stat. 27 (1878). The original section 20
of the 1834 Act had provided “it shall moreover be lawful for any person, in the
service of the Unites States, or for any Indian, to take and destroy any ardent
spirits or wine found in the Indian country, excepting military supplies as
mentioned in this section.” Act of June 30, 1834, § 20, 4 Stat. 732. An amendment
in 1864 substituted “the duty” for “lawful” in that passage. It remained a duty in
section 2140 of the Revised Statutes.
36. “In the Indian Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834 (4 Stat. at L. 729, chap.
161), the first section defined the ‘Indian country’ for the purposes of that act.
But this section was not reenacted in the Revised Statutes, and it was therefore
repealed by § 5596, Rev. Stat.” Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 268–69
(1913).
37. The Supreme Court remarked:
Nevertheless, although the section of the act of 1834 containing the
definition of that date has been repealed, it is not to be regarded as if it
had never been adopted, but may be referred to in connection with the
provisions of its original context which remain in force, and may be
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Congress did not redefine “Indian country” by statute until 1948.
Drawing upon the decades of case law in which the judiciary had
developed the concept, Congress fashioned the three-part definition—
reservations, dependent Indian communities, allotments—noted
above.38
The following year, Congress amended that definition, bifurcating
“Indian country” for purposes of the FILL from Indian country for other
purposes and explicitly providing that the FILL definition should yield
as to a particular parcel of land if there was a specific “treaty or statute
extending the Indian liquor laws thereto.”39
By 1949, federal enforcement of the FILL was faltering. Earlier in
the twentieth century, as prohibition was gaining momentum, Congress
had toughened certain FILL provisions,40 but in the aftermath of
prohibition’s repeal, enthusiasm for enforcing the FILL waned as well.41
considered in connection with the changes which have taken place in
our situation, with a view of determining from time to time what must
be regarded as Indian country, where it is spoken of in the statutes. It is
an admitted rule in the interpretation of statutes that clauses which
have been repealed may still be considered in construing the provisions
that remain in force.
Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883).
38. See supra note 4 (except that the twelve prefatory words were not part of
the 1948 enactment, having been added in 1949); see FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW sec. 3.04[2][c], at 189–98 (Nell Jessup Newton
ed., 2012) (discussing in depth Congress’s definition of “Indian Country”). The
new definition was part of a systematic revision of the federal criminal code
Congress undertook in 1948. Simultaneously, several portions of the FILL were
brought from Title 25 (Indians) into Title 18 (Criminal). Sections 241, 250, 252
and 254 of Title 25 were repealed, and essentially became new sections 1154 and
1156 of Title 18. Left in Title 25 were two unrepealed sections, one prohibiting
distilleries in Indian country, 25 U.S.C. § 251, and one creating an exception to
allow sacramental wines within Indian country or reservations, 25 U.S.C. § 253.
Prior to 1948, the FILL had been housed in Title 25 since Congress approved
that title in 1926, Pub. L. No. 61-440, 44 Stat. 777, and Pub. L. 61-441, 44 Stat. 778,
both enacted June 30, 1926. Prior to 1926 they were referred to by their Revised
Statutes section numbers, 2139-2141. Other portions of the Revised Statutes had
been recodified into a criminal code in 1909, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat.
1088-1159, but the federal Indian liquor laws were not encompassed in that
recodification.
39. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §§ 25, 27–28, 63 Stat. 94. 18 U.S.C. §§
1154(c), 1156 (2012). See supra text accompanying notes 13–14. Still, as of 1948,
the law prohibiting conveyance of alcohol to an Indian applied both inside and
outside Indian country.
40. In 1918 Congress had gone beyond the importation and sale
prohibitions, to prohibit possession by itself within Indian country. Act of May
25, 1918, 40 Stat. 561, 563 (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 1156 (2012)).
41. S. REP. NO. 1423, 73rd Cong. (2d Sess. 1934):
In a number of cases, in statutes authorizing the opening of certain
parts of Indian reservations to sale, settlement, etc., Congress has
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By the mid-twentieth century, objections mounted that the FILL
seemed anachronistic, paternalistic, patronizing, and inconsistent with
developing notions of civil rights and individual freedoms of Indians as
citizens of the United States,42 and not in keeping with the general
emphasis on assimilation that was starting to dominate the federal
policy of that era.43
In 1953, Congress responded to these concerns, not by repealing the
FILL, but rather by truncating them in two respects. First, they would
only have application in Indian country.44 Second, even in Indian
country, they would not have any application to a liquor transaction as
long as that transaction was performed in compliance with the laws of
both the relevant state and the relevant tribe for that particular parcel of
Indian country.45
This inspired solution relieved the federal government of most of
its enforcement burden, as the federal law would function only as a

provided that the Indian liquor laws shall continue in force for certain
periods, usually 25 years, or until otherwise provided by Congress . . . .
During the first few years after the throwing open of such lands to sale
and settlement, it has been considered advisable to have the special
Indian liquor laws continued in force for the protection of the Indians.
However, the proportion of white population has largely increased,
towns of considerable size have grown up, and many of the inhabitants
do not believe that they should be subject to the sweeping prohibitions
governing Indian and Indian reservations. Since national prohibition
has been repealed, many protests have been received against the
enforcement of these laws in such areas. It is becoming increasingly
difficult to enforce the Indian prohibition laws in such areas. The
present appropriation for this work is entirely inadequate to employ
sufficient men to make the law effective.
Id. (The bill supported by this report, H.R. 8662, to modify the operation of the
Indian liquor laws on lands which were formerly Indian lands, was enacted as
Pub. L. 73-478, 48 Stat. 1245.).
42. “A law restricting only a certain race of people is, therefore,
discriminatory and against the principles of this free country.” 99 Cong. Rec.
A1978 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1953) (extension of remarks of Sen. Goldwater,
presenting letter from Clarence Wesley, Chairman, San Carlos Apache Tribal
Council, San Carlos, Arizona).
43. “In his letter Mr. Wesley refutes the claims of those who think the
Indians have not reached a place where they can assume their rightful place in
our society, alongside their white brothers.” Id.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (“The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and
3669, of this title, shall not apply within any area that is not Indian
country . . . .”).
45. Id. (“[N]or to any act or transaction within any area of Indian country
provided such act or transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State
in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by
the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified by the
Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register.”).
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backup; it made Indian country subject to state alcohol laws, in keeping
with the assimilative zeitgeist, and it gave the tribes the ability to enact
their own ordinances, which could be more restrictive than state law but
would not provide a shield against enforcement of state law.
This newly shared-authority structure was challenged, first by nonIndian bar owners resisting tribal authority. In United States v. Mazurie,46
the owners of the Blue Bull Bar, situated on one of the substantial tracts
of non-Indian-held land scattered within the Wind River Reservation,
argued they had a right to operate that bar by reason of their license
from the State of Wyoming and could not be required to also obtain a
license from the Wind River Tribes.47 After about a year of operating
without a tribal license, the owners were prosecuted and convicted
under the FILL.48 They appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which reversed,
ruling that insofar as 18 U.S.C. § 1161 authorized Indian tribes to adopt
ordinances controlling the introduction by non-Indians of alcohol onto
non-Indian land, it was an invalid congressional attempt to delegate
authority.49 The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding that
Congress could validly regulate such sales and could validly delegate its
authority to the Tribe50:
[W]hen Congress, delegated its authority to control the
introduction of alcoholic beverages into Indian country, it did
so to entities which possess a certain degree of independent
authority over matters that affect the internal and social
relations of tribal life. Clearly the distribution and use of
intoxicants is just such a matter. We need not decide whether
this independent authority is itself sufficient for the tribes to
impose Ordinance No. 26. It is necessary only to state that the
independent tribal authority is quite sufficient to protect
Congress’ decision to vest in tribal councils this portion of its
own authority ‘to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
tribes.’51
A mirror-image challenge to state authority was resolved in Rice v.

46. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
47. See id. at 546–48 (discussing the owner of the Blue Bull’s situation).
48. Id. at 548–49.
49. Id. at 549–50. The owners raised other arguments as well: that the bar’s
location on fee-patented land in a non-Indian community brought it within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1154 and thus outside Indian country for purposes of the
FILL, and that the meaning of “non-Indian community” was unconstitutionally
vague. The Tenth Circuit agreed, but the Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 550,
552–53.
50. Id. at 553–58.
51. Id. at 557.
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Rehner.52 A federally licensed trader operating a general store on an
Indian reservation sought a declaratory judgment that she was not
required to obtain a state liquor license to sell liquor there. Although the
Ninth Circuit agreed, the Supreme Court did not. The assumption that
States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation
was “unwarranted in the narrow context of the regulation of liquor.”53
Under the 1953 law,
It is clear then that Congress viewed § 1161 as abolishing
federal prohibition, and as legalizing Indian liquor transactions
as long as those transactions conformed both with tribal
ordinance and state law. It is also clear that Congress
contemplated that its absolute but not exclusive power to
regulate Indian liquor transactions would be delegated to the
tribes themselves, and to the States . . . .54
Thus, the 1953 enactment was a valid delegation to states and
tribes, each of which can impose their own restrictions on intoxicant
transactions, and neither of which can claim to exercise such authority to
the exclusion of the other. Notably, neither in Mazurie nor in Rice was
the state suing the tribe or vice versa. Rather, in each case, a private
business sought to escape one government’s regulation by arguing that
the other government’s authority was exclusive. Each argument failed.
If this works in the lower 48, it likely could work in Alaska. But we
have not yet completely unraveled the Venetie/Rice syllogism. FILL
Indian country can be created by Congressional extension of the FILL to
a particular parcel of land, without making that land into “full” Indian
country within the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 1151. But this only
establishes that Congress has the authority to do so; it remains to be
established that there was some point at which Congress extended the
Indian liquor laws to Alaska.

III. THE FEDERAL INDIAN LIQUOR LAWS IN ALASKA
Alaska was acquired by the United States in 1867, at which point
the federal Indian liquor laws were still housed in sections 20 and 21 of
the 1834 Act.55 At that point, Indian country was still defined as lands

52. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
53. Id. at 723. It was in this context that the Court stated “there can be no
doubt that Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate
in the area.” Id. at 724.
54. Id. at 728.
55. As amended by the Acts of Feb. 13, 1862 and March 15, 1864, see supra
notes 30, 35. Thus, portions of section 20 of the 1834 Act now applied to
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“west of the Mississippi and not within the States of Missouri and
Louisiana or the Territory or Arkansas.” Secretary of State William
Seward and President Andrew Johnson had just acquired a large chunk
of such lands,56 and Congress embarked on the task of deciding what
laws would apply thereto.
A.

1868: New Customs for Alaska

In 1868, the first Congressional enactment concerning Alaska made
the newly acquired land a customs collection district with no governor,
no legislature, and no courts. Legal issues were to be addressed to the
federal district courts of California, Oregon, or the Washington
Territory.57 The 1868 law extended the federal laws “relating to customs,
commerce, and navigation” to Alaska’s “mainland, islands and
waters . . . so far as the same may be applicable thereto.”58 This logically
encompassed the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, enacted pursuant to
the Indian commerce clause.59

providing liquor to Indians inside and outside Indian country.
56. Treaty of Cession, June 20, 1867, 15 Stat. 539.
57. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 273, § 7, 15 Stat. 240.
58. Id. § 1.
59. Section 4 of the 1868 Act, 15 Stat. at 241, gave the President “power to
restrict and regulate or to prohibit the importation and use of fire-arms,
ammunition, and distilled spirits into and within the said territory.” President
Andrew Johnson initially prohibited importation of all firearms, ammunition
and liquor, except that the Secretary of the Treasury could prescribe regulations
under which they could be sold “in limited quantities” and only “to such
persons as the military or other chief authority in said Territory may specially
designate in permits for that purpose.” JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3865 (1897). “Such persons” were
limited to whites. Letter from Hugh McCulloch, Treasury Secretary, to Wm. S.
Dodge, Special Agent and Acting Customs Collector at Sitka (Feb. 5, 1868) (on
file with National Records Seattle, Records of U.S. Customs Service) (“Wines and
distilled spirits, in limited quantities . . . may be transported from any port in the
United States on the Pacific Coast, to the said port of Sitka, and to none other in
the Territory aforesaid, for the purposes of sale to resident white citizens of said
Territory. . . .”). President Grant kept in place the liquor prohibition. Larry
Arthur Sparks, The Failure of Prohibition in Alaska: 1884-1900 12-13 (1974), available
at http://www.skepticalthayne.com/prohibition.pdf. The understanding
continued to be that liquor was absolutely prohibited to Natives, but not to
whites. See Letter from William Kapus, Collector, to Vincent Colyer, Special U.S.
Indian Comm’r, Sitka, Alaska (Oct. 25, 1869), in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON INDIAN AFFAIRS 579 (1869) (“The liquors that were seized by me
in the month of August from on board the steamship Active were sold at this
port on the 14th instant, but were delivered to the purchasers only in limited
quantities for the use of white inhabitants, and, as the law requires, upon the
written permits of the general commanding the department.”).
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Either under the 1834 geographical definition of Indian country,60
or under the 1862 amendment removing the Indian country limitation
for certain Indian liquor law offenses,61 or as a function of the 1868 Act
extending the federal commerce laws to Alaska, the widespread
assumption—both among the public and within governmental
agencies—was that the terms of the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act
prohibited conveying alcohol to Alaska Natives. An April 1869 issue of
the Alaska Times warned readers that “[t]he law against selling liquor to
Indians in Alaska is very strict,” and “call[ed] the attention of the
merchants of this Territory to the laws of Congress, conserning [sic] the
safe [sic] of liquors to Indians . . . ,” setting out verbatim the Act of Feb.
13, 1862 (amending the Trade and Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834).62
Officials within the Departments of Treasury63 and State64 had
concluded that Alaska was Indian country shortly after its acquisition.
Secretary of State Seward, who had negotiated the original Treaty of
Cession, expressed the same view.65 This certainly appeared to be the

60. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729. See supra note 19.
61. Congress had twice amended section 20 of the 1834 Act by the time
Alaska was purchased. See supra notes 30, 35.
62. ALASKA TIMES, April 30, 1869.
63. Letter from W.A. Howard, Captain U.S.R. Marine, Special Agent
Treasury Dep’t, to Honorable Hugh McCulloch, Sec’y of the Treasury, in
RUSSIAN AMERICA, H.R. DOC. NO. 40-177, at 196 (2d Sess. 1868) [hereinafter
RUSSIAN AMERICA] (“Until laws or regulations are perfected for the government
of this territory I shall consider it as an Indian reservation, so far as liquors are
concerned.”); see also Letter from Hiram Ketchum Jr., Custom-House, Port of
Sitka and Dist. of Alaska, to Bvt. Maj. Gen. J.C. Davis, U.S. Army, commanding
Dep’t of Alaska (Dec. 15, 1868), quoted in Letter from Ketchum to Treasury
Secretary Hugh McCulloch (Dec. 15, 1868), in ALASKA BOUNDARY TRIBUNAL, Vol.
II, 338, 452–53 (1903) (stating a similar sentiment).
64. Letter from E. Peshine Smith, Examiner, to Bureau of Claims (Sept. 5,
1867), in RUSSIAN AMERICA, supra note 63, at 96 (“I think, therefore, that the new
territory became a part of the Indian country on the 20th June last.”).
65. The relevant portion of Seward’s letter reads as follows:
I understand the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Harrison vs. Cross, (16 Howard, 164-202), to declare . . . that
upon the addition to the United States of new territory by conquest and
cession, the acts regulating foreign commerce attach to and take effect
within such territory ipso facto . . . I can see no reason for a
discrimination in this respect between acts regulating foreign
commerce and the laws regulating intercourse with the Indian
tribes. . . . The act of June 30, 1834, (4 Stat., 729) defines the Indian
country as, in part, ‘all that part of the United States west of the
Mississippi and not within the States of Missouri and Louisiana, or the
Territory of Arkansas.’ This, by a happy elasticity of expression,
widening as our dominion widens, includes the territory ceded by
Russia.
Letter from Wm. H. Seward to the Sec’y of War (Jan. 30, 1869), quoted in WILLIAM
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assumption of the Department of War.66
This assumption, however, came to an abrupt end when the United
States v. Seveloff67 case came before Oregon Federal District Court Judge
Matthew Deady in 1872.
B.

1872: Seveloff and a Brief History of Tom

Ferueta Seveloff, a Sitka Creole, was arrested by military
authorities in Sitka and subsequently indicted by an Oregon grand jury
for introducing spirituous liquors into the Indian country (Sitka) and for
giving liquor to “one John Doe,” an Indian residing at the Sitka Indian
agency under the charge of the Indian Agent for Sitka.68
Judge Deady, tasked with ruling on Seveloff’s demurrer that the
1834 Act should not apply in Alaska, reviewed the three separate
opinions in the Tom case of twenty years earlier,69 dismissed Attorney
General Cushing’s critique, and adopted the view that the 1834 Act did
not by itself extend to lands subsequently acquired by the United
States.70
However, where the Tom court had concluded that the subsequent
1850 Oregon Act sufficed to extend the liquor law provisions to Oregon,
Judge Deady decided that the analogous “extending” provision in
section 1 of the 1868 Alaska Act did not extend the liquor law provisions
to Alaska.71 Judge Deady acknowledged that the 1834 Act was a law
relating to commerce:
W. BELKNAP, U.S. WAR DEP’T, JURISDICTION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT OVER THE
TERRITORY OF ALASKA, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 44-135 at 5 (1876) [hereinafter WAR
JURISDICTION].
66. WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 22. “The opinion of the Attorney
General [Cushing] . . . and the communication from the Secretary of State
[Seward] to the Secretary of War, dated January 30, 1869, have heretofore been
regarded as authority upon the points. . . .” Id.
67. 27 F. Cas. 1021 (D. Or. 1872) (No. 16,252).
68. Id. at 1022; SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
214 (1994). Seveloff was apparently arrested on June 19, 1872 and sent to
Portland on August 19, 1872. Message Of The President Of The United States,
Communicating, In Answer To A Senate Resolution Of January 7, 1876,
Information In Relation To Military Arrests In The Territory Of Alaska During
The Past Five Years, S. Exec. Doc. No. 33, 44-1, at 3 (1st Sess. 1876) [hereinafter
Military Arrests 1871–1876].
69. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. at 1023.
70. Id.
71. Extending “the laws of the United States relating to customs, commerce
and navigation” to Alaska, “so far as the same may be applicable thereto,”
language that echoed that “so far as [its provisions] may be applicable” clause
that Chief Justice Williams had found permitted application of the liquor law
prohibitions to Oregon. Id. at 1024.
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Unless, then, there is something in the circumstances of the
case or in the act, from which it appears that congress did not
intend to use the phrase, ‘laws relating to commerce,’ in an
unqualified sense, it follows that the act of 1834 is in force in
Alaska, as a regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes
therein.72
However, he also posited two circumstances that, by implication,
persuaded him that Congress did not intend to use the term “laws
relating to commerce” in an unqualified sense. First, he thought
“commerce” should mean solely commerce with foreign nations and the
several states, not commerce with Indian tribes.73 Second, he thought
section four of the 1868 Alaska Act, giving the President the authority to
deal with spirituous liquors, should be given a pre-emptive reading and
govern the whole subject.74 He acknowledged that his legal conclusion
might be at odds with the facts on the ground in Alaska (which he had
not visited)75: “the territory of Alaska is not a part of ‘the Indian
country,’ so declared by law, whatever it may be in fact.”76
Judge Deady correctly noted that the separate count charging
Seveloff with giving spirituous liquors to Indians did not depend on
whether Alaska was Indian country or not.77 But he further stated that
“[i]t has been so common a habit of congress upon the acquisition of
territory to specially extend the laws of the United States over it, that an
impression seems to prevail that without such action these laws would
not affect territory acquired after their passage.”78 He let that prevailing
impression control his decision, although simultaneously observing
“[f]or my own part, I can see no good reason why any general law of the
United States does not become in force at once, in any country acquired

72. Id.
73. Id. This seems irreconcilable with the United States Supreme Court
opinion in United States v. Halliday on the same federal Indian liquor laws:
The act in question . . . is, we think, still more clearly entitled to be
called a regulation of commerce. . . . The law before us professes to
regulate traffic and intercourse with the Indian tribes. It manifestly
does both. It relates to buying and selling and exchanging commodities,
which is the essence of all commerce, and it regulates the intercourse
between the citizens of the United States and those tribes, which is
another branch of commerce, and a very important one.
70 U.S. 407, 416–17 (1865).
74. Id.
75. Judge Deady did visit Alaska, but not until 1880. Niedermeyer, supra
note 32, at 221.
76. United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021, 1024 (D. Or. 1872) (No. 16,252).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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by it, without reference to the time of its passage.”79
With the indictments dismissed, Seveloff was free to continue
conveying as much liquor as he pleased to the Alaska natives without
fear of prosecution. Judge Deady expressed reservations about his
ruling: “I would not be understood as stating this conclusion without
doubt. On the contrary, I have reached it with hesitation, and express it
subject to correction.”80 Nonetheless, he thought it “safer to err . . . by
declining jurisdiction than to accept it. If congress should think it
desirable that this or any other provision of the Indian intercourse act
should be in force in Alaska, it can so provide, beyond doubt.”81
As it happened, Congress did think it desirable that sections 20 and
21 of the 1834 Act should be in force in Alaska and did so provide,
almost immediately.
C.

1873: The Seveloff Fix, Or One Thing Leads to Another

The Seveloff ruling alarmed the War Department82 and threw its
policy into “complete confusion.”83 Three days after the decision,
Brigadier General Canby wrote a letter asking that the Secretary of War
press for legislation to remedy the situation.84
Interior Secretary Delano endorsed this request and expressed in
writing to Speaker of the House James Blaine that distilled liquors,
manufactured in Alaska, were being sold to the Indian tribes to the
Indians’ “great injury and demoralization.”85 Delano suggested
amending the original 1868 Alaska Act by extending to Alaska the liquor
law provisions of the 1834 non-intercourse act.86
Congress quickly adopted Delano’s suggestion. Less than three
months after the Seveloff decision,87 Congress explicitly made sections 21

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t of the Interior, M-36975 at 18 (Jan. 11, 1993),
http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opinions/M-36975.pdf.
83. HARRING, supra note 68, at 214.
84. WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 22 n.26.
85. F. Rives et al., THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE: CONTAINING THE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD SESSION FORTY-SECOND CONGRESS; WITH AN APPENDIX,
EMBRACING THE LAWS PASSED AT THAT SESSION 2023 (1873).
86. Donald R. McCoy, The Special Indian Agency in Alaska 1873–1874: Its
Origins and Operation, 25 PAC. HIST. REV. 355, 360 (Nov. 1956). Delano also
requested that Congress provide for the appointment of an Indian Agent at
$3,000 a year, to enforce this proposed legislation and perform other duties.
Although Congress did not fund this, Delano appointed an agent nonetheless,
until told he lacked authority to do so. Id.
87. Seveloff was decided on December 10, 1872. The corrective legislation
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and 22 of the 1834 Act applicable to Alaska.
[S]ection one of an act entitled ‘An act to extend the laws of the
United States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation
over the territory ceded to the United States by Russia, to
establish a collection district therein, and for other purposes,’
approved July twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and sixtyeight, be so amended as to read as follows: ‘That the laws of the
United States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation,
and sections twenty and twenty-one of “An act to regulate
trade and intercourse with Indian tribes and to preserve peace
on the frontiers,” approved June thirtieth, eighteen hundred
and thirty-four, be, and the same are hereby, extended to and
over all the mainland, islands, and waters of the territory ceded
to the United States by the Emperor of Russia, by treaty
concluded at Washington on the thirtieth day of March, anno
Domini eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, so far as the same
may be applicable thereto.88
This was the “Seveloff fix,” and with the enactment of this
undramatic and perhaps overly punctilious language, the federal Indian
liquor laws were extended throughout Alaska.
This enactment sparked a lively discussion within the executive
branch agencies as to whether Alaska had been made Indian country for
all purposes or only for purposes of the FILL, as detailed in the
following section. This distinction would determine whether other
important provisions of the 1834 Act would apply within Alaska. The
discussion resonates currently, as the courts eventually concluded that
Congress had intended to recognize Alaska as Indian country only for
liquor law purposes and not for general purposes. Giving effect to that
Congressional intent today points the way for harmonizing the
conclusion that Alaska Native Villages occupy Indian country solely for
purposes of Indian liquor laws with the conclusion in Venetie that for the
most part they do not occupy Indian country for general purposes.
D.

1873-1876: Campbell’s Suits
In response to questions posed by the Secretary of War, U.S.

was passed on March 3, 1873. No arrests for liquor law violations had been
made during that interval, although George Austin, arrested for “disposing of
liquor to Indians” on December 6, 1872, was not released until January 20, 1873.
Military Arrests 1871–1876, supra note 68, at 3.
88. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 227, 17 Stat. 530.
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Attorney General Williams issued opinions on the new law.89 In his first
opinion, Williams responded to the question “what is Indian country”
by analogizing the 1873 Seveloff fix to the 1850 Act concerning Oregon
and similar 1851 legislation concerning New Mexico and Utah,
seemingly saying that within such territories “Indian country” would
encompass all reservations and all Indian lands to which title had not
been extinguished.90 War Secretary Belknap sent a more Alaska-specific
inquiry in November 1873, asking whether the term “Indian country”
embraced the Territory of Alaska, and also whether the War Department
had authority to exercise control over the introduction of spirituous
liquors into that Territory.91 Williams responded “My opinion, therefore,
is that, as to this matter, Alaska is to be regarded as ‘Indian country,’
and that no spirituous liquors or wines can be introduced into that
Territory without an order by the War Department for that purpose.”92
With the Treasury Department’s cooperation,93 the War Department
issued orders implementing enforcement of sections 20 and 21, on May

89. As Oregon Chief Justice twenty years earlier, Williams had written one
of the Tom decisions.
90. He said:
I think it unquestionable, both as regards the region west of the
Mississippi originally included within the limits of the Indian country
by the act of 1834, and as regards the region formerly included within
the Territories just mentioned, that all Indian reservations occupied by
Indian tribes, and also all other districts so occupied to which the
Indian title has not been extinguished, are Indian country within the
meaning of the intercourse-laws, and remain (to a greater or less extent,
according as they lie within a State or a Territory) subject to the
provisions thereof.
14 Op. Att’y. Gen. 290, at 6 (1873). He refrained from addressing questions about
the status of lands that had been opened up for white settlement due to a
pending United States Supreme Court case, planning to update the Secretary of
War after that case was decided. However, an annotation to the opinion notes
that the United States Supreme Court dismissed the case. Id.
91. Id. at 327.
92. Id. In June 1874, the Attorney General responded to another question
from the Secretary of War, indicating that the Department of War had authority
to permit the introduction of spirituous liquors or wines into Alaska, even when
those were not for the use of officers or troops of the United States. Introduction
of Spirituous Liquors or Wines in Alaska, 14 Op. Att’y. Gen. 401, 401 (1874). The
Attorney General reasoned that the 1864 amendment gave the War Department
broader discretion for allowing the importation. Id. at 401–02 (“It shall be a
sufficient defense to any charge of introducing or attempting to introduce liquor
to the Indian country, if it be proved to be done by order of the War Department
or of any officer duly authorized thereto by the War Department.”).
93. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, in answer to, a Senate
resolution of Mar. 15, 1876, transmitting the report of a special agent on the
Territory of Alaska and the collection of the customs revenue therein, S. EXEC.
DOC. NO. 44-37, at 9–10 (1st Sess. 1876).

ARTICLE 2 - HARRINGTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

THE SEVELOFF FIX

5/18/2015 2:03 PM

51

16, 1874.94
Captain Joseph Campbell took command of Sitka post on August
17, 1874, and found five prisoners who had been arrested for Indian
liquor law violations in June 1874.95 En route to his post, Campbell had
been briefed by Brevet Major-General Jefferson Davis, who was
commanding the Department of Columbia (Portland, Oregon) at the
time.96 Davis warned Campbell against sending the prisoners to the
Oregon courts because the Oregon courts and U.S. courts in Oregon
would deny jurisdiction.97 Campbell expressed frustration that he was
ordered to “proceed against” the detainees but not told how to do so,
aside from Davis’ instructions not to send them for court proceedings.98
Relying on the 69th article of war,99 Campbell continued to hold the
detainees. Two of the five men took ill and died in the post hospital.100
Campbell finally received authorization to release the remaining men on
a type of military-fixed bail, “a measure I recommended myself, not
seeing any other prospect of getting rid of the custody of these
people.”101
Nonetheless, Campbell continued to try to enforce the law as best
he could, and (notwithstanding Davis’s directive) eventually started
sending the new arrestees to Oregon for court proceedings. Campbell
discovered that despite the Treasury Department’s promise to
cooperate, its Wrangell deputy customs agent John Carr was part of the
94. War Dep’t, Adjutant-Gens. Office, Gen. Orders No. 40 (May 16, 1874),
included in WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 15–16.
95. Letter from Capt. Joseph Campbell, Headquarters, Sitka, Alaska, to
Assistant Adjutant-Gen., Headquarters Dep’t of the Columbia (Jan. 20, 1876),
quoted in Military Arrests 1871–1876, supra note 68, at 2–3.
96. Davis had been transferred from Alaska to New York in 1871. DONALD
CRAIG MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN: THE STORY OF ALASKA NATIVES AND THEIR LAND
1867–1959 51–52 (1997). In April of 1873, he was given command of the
Department of the Columbia within the Division of the Pacific, in which position
he presumably had his discussion with Captain Campbell. Id. In 1874, Davis was
transferred again, to Omaha. Id.
97. Letter from Capt. Joseph Campbell, Headquarters, Sitka, Alaska, to
Assistant Adjutant-Gen., Headquarters Dep’t of the Columbia (Jan. 20, 1876),
quoted in Military Arrests 1871–1876, supra note 68, at 3. The basis for Davis’s
directive is unclear. It is possible that Davis was thinking of Judge Deady’s
rulings in Seveloff, perhaps unaware that the statute had been amended, perhaps
just distrustful of the Oregon courts.
98. Id.
99. Any officer who presumes, without proper authority, to release any
person committed to his charge, or suffers any person so committed to escape,
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. Articles of War, SONS OF UNION
VETERANS OF THE CIVIL WAR, http://suvcw.org/education/documents/articles
.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (discussing Art. 81).
100. Military Arrests 1871–1876, supra note 68, at 2–3.
101. Id. at 3.
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problem, having accepted a one hundred dollar bribe from Wrangell
resident W. P. Wilson for allowing a lot of liquors from the bonded
warehouse at Fort Wrangell to be taken to Wilson’s house.102 Captain
Campbell dispatched Lieutenant Dyer to Wrangell to arrest Carr and
gather witness statements.103 Carr was arrested in September, and he
arrived in Sitka in October. Unfortunately, Dyer failed to send the
witness statements by the same boat with the arrestees.104 Campbell was
unable to get the witness statements in time for the October boat to
Portland, and was unwilling to send Carr and the other detainees to
Portland without the witness statements, as this “would be equivalent to
liberating them.”105 Instead, Campbell elected to keep Carr in custody.
Carr, unwilling to wait, had his attorneys file for habeas corpus. This
brought the matter in front of Judge Deady, who ordered Carr be
brought to Portland in December.106
Carr’s argument was that section 23 of the 1834 Act, allowing the
military to make arrests for violations of the Act, was not one of the
sections extended to Alaska. Judge Deady disagreed:107
Section 1 of the Alaska act of July 27, 1868 (15 Stat. 240), having
been amended by the act of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat. 530), so as to
extend over the territory of Alaska, sections 20 and 21 of the
intercourse act of 1834, said territory, so far as the introduction
and disposition of spirituous liquors is concerned, became
what is known as ‘Indian Country;’ and the military force of
the United States may be employed by the president for the
arrest of persons found therein violating either of said sections.
To accomplish this result it was not necessary for congress to
extend section 23 of the intercourse act by name over Alaska.
By force of its own terms that section applies to any territory of
the United States declared by congress, either in terms or effect,
to be ‘Indian Country’—that is, a country in which the
intercourse between the whites and Indians is regulated and
restrained by special acts of congress. So soon, then, as Alaska
was made ‘Indian Country,’ so far as the introduction and use
of spirituous liquors is concerned, section 23 of the act which
authorizes the employment of military force became applicable

102. See In re Carr, 5 F.Cas. 115, 116 (C.C. D. Or. 1875). See also note 125, infra.
103. Letter from Captain Joseph B. Campbell, Headquarters, Sitka, Alaska, to
Assistant Adjutant-Gen., Headquarters Dep’t of the Columbia (Jan. 20, 1876),
included in Military Arrests 1871–1876, supra note 68, at 3.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In Re Carr, 5 F.Cas. at 115.
107. See id. at 115–16.
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to it, and in force therein. 108
Judge Deady gave more credence to Carr’s second argument, that
section 23 only allowed military detentions for five days, within which
civil authorities had to remove the defendant for trial. Carr had
languished for about ninety days, and thus was entitled to be
discharged.109 However, Judge Deady took note of the witness affidavit
that Lieutenant Dyer and Captain Campbell finally managed to retrieve
from Wrangell, and ruled that Carr should be committed to answer the
charge for violating section 20, with bail set at $2500.110 This made the
successful habeas ruling something of a Pyrrhic victory for Carr. He
should not have been held in custody, but still had to face the charge.
That five-day limit was a major problem; there were no civil
authorities to whom custody could be transferred reachable within five
days of Sitka.111 Immediately after the Carr decision, Campbell’s new
commanding officer General Howard requested through the War
Department that Congress amend section 23’s five-day limit.112 This
apparently was unsuccessful,113 but General Howard thereafter
proposed an easier non-legislative solution. If Captain Campbell were to
be appointed as the Indian agent for Alaska, then he would be able to
take action as to liquor law violations independently of his military
authority, circumventing the five-day limit as that applied only to
military arrests.114 General Howard telegraphed the Division
Headquarters in San Francisco on March 9, 1875: “According to
instructions of General Halleck [September 6, 1867], commandant in
Alaska is ex officio agent for Indian affairs. Please ask that this authority
be sanctioned by Secretary of Interior. This will protect commandant

108. Id.
109. Id. at 116.
110. Id.
111. See id. (citing to a prior, apparently unpublished decision in which
Deady had held a defendant liable for false imprisonment when the defendant
had arrested the plaintiff under section 23 and detained him more than five days
before removal, “because he had no sufficient means wherewith to do
otherwise, . . .”).
112. Letter from the Sec’y of War communicating copy of a telegram from the
commanding general of the military Dep’t of the Pac., in relation to the length of
time of retention of military prisoners, under section 23, Act of Jan. 30, 1834, S.
DOC. NO. 43-15 (2d Sess. 1877) (“Please ask for legislation extending the time so
as to give reasonable time to bring prisoners to Portland and deliver to United
States marshal. This action necessary to enable United States to execute
requirements of sections 20 and 21.”).
113. The five-day limit remained in the statute. Revised Statutes § 2151.
114. “[N]o person, apprehended by military force as aforesaid, shall be
detained longer than five days after the arrest and before the removal.” Act of
June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729, § 23 (1834) quoted in In Re Carr, 5 F.Cas. at 116.
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against civil suits.”115 After extensive discussion among the Attorney
General and the Departments of War and Interior about the
permissibility of the arrangement, Interior finally agreed not to object,
Secretary of War Belknap made the appointment official, and Captain
Campbell became the Indian agent in Alaska on May 21.116
Captain Campbell now had a strong hand, but he proceeded to
overplay it. Perhaps due to his new-found status as Indian agent, or
perhaps due to the Carr decision (ruling that section 23 arrest authority
was impliedly encompassed in the 1873 extension of sections 20 and 21
to Alaska), Campbell became convinced that Alaska was now Indian
country for more purposes than just the federal Indian liquor laws. In
July 1875, he issued General Order 96, announcing enforcement of
several other Indian country provisions in addition to sections 20 and
21.117
Reaction was swift and generally unfavorable. Fifteen days after its
issuance, the Portland Board of Trade wrote to War Secretary Belknap
requesting that Order 96 be withdrawn as against the interest of trade
and commerce with Oregon.118 About a month after the new rules, Sitka
Customs House Collector M.P. Berry penned a report outlining the
problems Campbell’s new rules imposed.119 In October, Indian Affairs
Commissioner Smith, who had supported General Howard’s original
request for Campbell’s Indian agent status, concluded that Alaska was
Indian country only for purposes of sections 20 and 21, and that Captain
Campbell had overstepped his authority.120 In November, the Judge
Advocate General’s office reached a similar conclusion.121
Campbell’s commanding officer Gen. Howard countermanded a
portion of Order 96 and instructed Campbell not to enforce the licensing
requirement for traders already doing business in Alaska, limiting its
enforcement to new traders.122 Howard allowed enforcement of the
remainder of Order 96, although he noted that he would be sending it to
the War Department and the Indian Bureau for review.123
Campbell vigorously defended his actions in November 1875. He
explained that the Natives had learned from American soldiers how to

115. Telegram from Howard to Division Headquarters (Mar. 9, 1875),
included in WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 33.
116. Id. at 33–38.
117. Id. at 39–40.
118. Id. at 38.
119. Id. at 29.
120. Id. at 44–45.
121. Id. at 47–48.
122. Id. at 42.
123. Id.
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construct and operate stills to create their own “hoochinoo”, and the
restrictions he imposed on importing sugar and molasses (relying on his
general Indian country authority) were intended to thwart these
operations.124 Regarding the complaints from customs officials, he noted
that Carr and others had participated in the liquor trade, and those
customs officials not actively violating the law were lax about enforcing
it.125
Campbell’s position that Alaska was full Indian country was
bolstered by an opinion rendered by the Assistant Adjutant to General
Howard in December:
I do not comprehend that fine, metaphysical vague reasoning
which regards Alaska as Indian country in one case, but perhaps
not in another case. If one desires to introduce liquor, it is
Indian country; if he does not it is not Indian country, or
doubtful. This method of reasoning calls to mind the interview
between Hamlet and Polonius. Yonder cloud has the shape of a
camel, weasel, or whale, depending on the medium through
which it is seen. Alaska is Indian country, or not, according to
the stand-point from which it is viewed. My opinion is that
Alaska is Indian country, or that it is not Indian country. If it is
Indian country for one purpose it is Indian country for all.126

124. Id. at 30–31. Many shared Campbell’s molasses anxiety. For example,
years later, the Chilkat Chief Chartrich conveyed a request that the sale of
molasses in large quantities by Juneau traders to his tribe be stopped to cut off
the supply from which hoochinoo was being made. Governor Swineford replied:
I regret being compelled to say that the law places no restriction upon
the sale of sugar and molasses to the natives, and that I am powerless in
the premises. All I can do, at the most, is to prefer a request to the
Juneau traders that they desist from making such trades, and leave
them to heed the request or not, as they may see fit.
Letter from Gov. A.P. Swineford to Lieutenant-Commander J.S. Newell (June 1,
1887), in ALASKA BOUNDARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. II, 338, 388 (1903).
125. WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 32 (“[T]he impression made upon me
as to the zeal of the customs officials for the suppression of illegal trade is not
very favorable. I was obliged to arrest the deputy collector, Carr, at Wrangel, last
year, for violation of liquor-law and malfeasance in office in regard to the
custody of seized property, and since then all kinds of rascality are being found
out against him. The deputy collector, McKnight, at this place, encouraged
violation of the law by purchasing liquor he knew was illegally sold. The
customs officials are directed by the Hon. Secretary of the Treasury to assist the
military in the execution of the non-intercourse laws, but they never, or rarely,
actually do anything.”).
126. Id. at 54. However, while asserting that “[t]he legality of [the orders
issued by] Captain Campbell, . . . in my judgment cannot be questioned,” and
that “I do not think [Captain Campbell] has exceeded his authority,” the
Adjutant further opined that Campbell’s orders were “injudicious and unwise,”
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While the debate simmered within and among the agencies of the
Executive Branch, the howls from the outraged Portland Board of Trade
reached the halls of Congress. In December 1875, Senator Sargent of
California introduced a bill to repeal the Seveloff fix,127 notwithstanding
the opposition of the War Department.128
The debate within the military reached the desk of General
Schofield, Commander of the Division of the Pacific. Schofield expressed
his view that Campbell’s restrictions on trade within Alaska were “evil,”
but referred the matter to the Secretary of the Department of War,
recommending that Congress be encouraged to provide a government
for the territory suited to its condition.129 Secretary Belknap had his
adjutant prepare a brief appending the various opinions, complaints and
correspondence, which he passed along to Congress in February 1876.130
But Congress took no action. Senator Sargent’s bill to repeal the
Seveloff fix (SB 87), which if enacted would have mooted the question of
whether Captain Campbell had overstepped his authority by removing
that authority completely, was reported back with a negative
recommendation in May 1876, and further action postponed
indefinitely.131 The Seveloff Fix had survived the first (and to date, the
only) Congressional proposal to repeal it.
Ultimately, it was Judge Deady who issued the definitive
pronouncement on Captain Campbell’s authority and the “full vs. FILL”
Indian country question. In 1876, he decided Waters v. Campbell, a civil
case brought against Campbell for false imprisonment132
Hugh Waters had been arrested for violations of the liquor laws
about three weeks after Carr’s arrest, and may have been one of Carr’s
associates.133 Waters was brought from Wrangell to Sitka, held in Sitka
for about two months, and then sent to Portland for trial, where the U.S.
Commissioner discharged him about four days after his arrival.134
Waters subsequently sued Captain Campbell for false imprisonment.
Campbell’s demurrer argued that Waters’ complaint failed to state a
cause of action; the complaint identified Waters as a “trader,” from
and he should be instructed to revoke them. Id. at 54–55.
127. 4 CONG. REC. 200 (1875).
128. WAR JURISDICTION, supra note 65, at 21.
129. Id. at 33, 56.
130. Id. at 1.
131. 4 CONG. REC. 3043 (1876).
132. 29 F. Cas. 411 (C.C. D. Or. 1876) (No. 17,264) (Waters I).
133. Waters was arrested October 24, 1874 according to Military Arrests,
supra note 68, at 4. One of the opinions refers to Waters’ complaint alleging he
was arrested September 18. Waters v. Campbell, 29 F. Cas. 412 (C.C.D.Or. 1877)
(No. 17,265) (Waters II). Carr was a witness for Waters, Id. at 412.
134. Waters II, 29 F. Cas. at 412.
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which Campbell argued the court should infer that Waters was trading
with Indians, and since Waters failed to allege that he had a license to
trade with Indians as required by § 2 of the 1834 Act, Captain Campbell
was therefore authorized to arrest and detain him even crediting all the
factual recitations in the complaint.
Judge Deady sided with Waters: “Alaska is not ‘Indian country’ in
the technical sense of that term any further than [C]ongress has made it
so.”135 With the 1873 amendment having extended §§ 20 and 21 of the
1834 Act to Alaska,
said territory, so far as the introduction and disposition of
spirituous liquors is concerned, was thereby made ‘Indian
country.’ [But] Subject to this restriction, the country seems to
be open to occupation and trade, even with Indians. The
provisions of the [I]ntercourse [A]ct of 1834 (§ 2129 et seq. of
the Revised Statutes) which prohibit trading with the Indians in
the Indian country, except under a license from a
superintendent or agent of Indian affairs, are local in their
character; and not having been specially extended over Alaska,
as §§ 20 and 21 aforesaid were, are, therefore, not in force
there.136
Thus, the facts alleged in the complaint did not establish that Campbell
had the authority to arrest Waters, and Waters’ civil case could
proceed.137
Judge Deady’s opinion settled the debate. Alaska’s Native Villages
were within Indian country for purposes of the FILL, but not Indian
country for other purposes. Assuming the Seveloff fix has not been
repealed, his opinion gave Alaska Native Villages a claim to occupying
Indian country for liquor law purposes, but by itself does not provide
“full” Indian country status for purposes beyond that.
E.

1876: Indian Country Disappears But Judge Deady Salvages the
Seveloff Fix
By the time Waters v. Campbell was decided, the “Revised Statutes”

135. Waters I, 29 F. Cas. at 411.
136. Id. at 411-12.
137. Campbell had authority to arrest Waters for violating section 20 or 21.
But Waters’ arrest in the fall of 1874 predated Campbell’s May 1875 status as
Indian agent, so was still subject to the five-day limit, thus shaving off only five
of the 113 days Waters was detained. Waters II, 29 F. Cas. at 412. A jury
eventually awarded Waters $3,500 against Captain Campbell, but this was
reduced to $2,000 upon Campbell’s motion for new trial, heard by Supreme
Court Justice Field and Judge Deady. Id. at 415.
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were in place. As noted above, this was the juncture at which the 1834
definition of Indian country disappeared.138
A second wrinkle peculiar to Alaska was omission of the “Seveloff
fix.” Section 1954 of the Revised Statutes contained § 1 of the 1868
Alaska Act as it had originally been enacted (extending the “laws of the
United States relating to customs, commerce and navigation” to Alaska),
but did not include the 1873 amendment explicitly extending to Alaska
§§ 20 and 21 of the 1834 Non-Intercourse Act. As such, it might seem
that it too, like the general definition of Indian country, was effectively
repealed by § 5966 of the Revised Statutes.139
However, there was a proviso clause to the repealer, which Judge
Deady analyzed in Waters I. He concluded that the omission of the
Seveloff fix from the Revised Statutes had not repealed it:
There is even some question whether said §§ 20 and 21 are in
force there [in Alaska] since the enactment of the Revised
Statutes. Chapter 3 of title 23 aforesaid, of the Revised Statutes,
does not contain § 1 of Alaska act, as amended by the general
appropriation act aforesaid, of March 3, 1873, but only as
originally enacted, and therefore the provisions extending §§ 20
and 21 of the Indian intercourse act over Alaska are not
contained in the Revised Statutes. . . . By the first clause of this
section [5966], the general appropriation act of March 3, 1873,
including the clause extending §§ 20 and 21 aforesaid over
Alaska, is repealed, because a portion of the same is embraced
in § 1954 ‘of said revision.’ But the proviso to the section
excepts from the operation of this clause ‘any provision of a
private, local or temporary character’ contained in such
appropriation act. The provision extending §§ 20 and 21 of the
Indian intercourse act over Alaska is local in its character, and
therefore not repealed by this repealing clause.’140
Thus, notwithstanding the exclusion of this provision from the
Revised Statutes, the 1873 extension to Alaska of sections 20 and 21 of
the 1834 Act (by this point, §§ 2139, 2140 and 2141 of the Revised
Statutes) was still good law and still applied to Alaska. The Seveloff fix
had survived its omission from the Revised Statutes.

138. See supra text and notes 33–37.
139. See supra note 36.
140. Waters I, 29 F. Cas. at 412.
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1882: In Pari Materia Versus Repeal by Implication, Round One

In his 1882 decision in United States v. Stephens,141 Judge Deady
considered how the 1873 Seveloff fix should fit together with § 4 of the
original 1868 Alaska Act, which had given the president the power to
restrict and regulate or to prohibit the importation and use of fire-arms,
ammunition, and distilled spirits within the territory of Alaska.142 In so
doing, he addressed an important question: when a new alcohol law
was enacted without explanation of how it was to fit alongside existing
alcohol laws, should the subsequent law be read in pari materia with the
prior law, or be read to impliedly repeal the prior law?
Judge Deady reasoned, “[p]robably the better conclusion is that the
acts should be construed as in pari materia, and both have effect so far as
possible.”143 Concluding that such a harmonized reading was possible,
he adopted that construction.144
G.

1884: The Alaska District Organic Act and Alaska’s First
Prohibition

In 1884, Congress enacted the Alaska District Organic Act, “[a]n act
providing for a civil government for Alaska.”145 This Act (1) created the
position of Governor, (2) established a district court with a judge, four
commissioners, a court clerk, a district attorney, and a marshal, and (3)
made Alaska a land district.146 It incorporated by reference the laws of
the State of Oregon, “so far as the same may be applicable and not in
conflict with the provisions of this act or the laws of the United
States.”147
Concerning liquor, § 14 of the 1884 Act specified that the provisions
in the Revised Statutes concerning Alaska were to remain in effect, and
further:
[T]he importation, manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors
in said district except for medicinal, mechanical and scientific
purposes is hereby prohibited under the penalties which are
provided in [§ 1955] of the Revised Statutes for the wrongful
importation of distilled spirits. And the President of the United
141. 12 F. 52 (C.C. D. Or. 1882).
142. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 273, §4, 15 Stat. 240 (1868).
143. Stephens, 12 F. at 54.
144. Id.
145. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24 [hereinafter Alaska District
Organic Act].
146. Id.
147. Id. § 7.
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States shall make such regulations as are necessary to carry out
the provisions of this section.148
Thus, from 1884 to 1899, in statute, Alaska was completely dry,
except for “medicinal, mechanical or scientific” purposes. Importation,
manufacture, and sale to Natives and non-Natives alike were equally
proscribed.
In practice, however, sales to Natives and sales to non-Natives
were not treated equally. Sales to Natives were prosecuted; sales to nonNatives were largely ignored.149 Alaska’s third governor Lyman Knapp
noted in his October 1889 annual report that there had been thirteen
indictments for furnishing intoxicating liquors to Indians,150 but:
It is noticeable that in the list of offenses for which prosecutions
were brought there is none for violations of the laws
prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors to
others than Indians, while it is a notorious fact that it is
furnished, without restraint or concealment, in all the towns
where there are white residents. Inquiries as to the reason
elicited the reply that prosecution would be of no avail—that
no jury in Alaska would convict for furnishing intoxicating

148. Id. § 14. On February 26, 1885 President Arthur made such a regulation,
ordering that no liquor could be landed in Alaska without a permit from
customs, to be issued only upon evidence that the liquor was to be used solely
for medicinal, mechanical, and scientific purposes, and further that no
manufacturing or sales could occur except under a license issued by the
Governor with those same restrictions. Treasury Circular No. 30, approved by
President Arthur (Feb. 26, 1885), quoted in United States v. Nelson, 29 F. 202, 206–
207 (D. Alaska 1886).
149. In 1885, Alaska’s second governor Alfred Swineford noted:
If any serious effort has been to enforce the provisions of section 14 of
the organic act, which prohibits the importation, manufacture, and sale
of intoxicating liquors, the result of such effort is not discernable in the
total or even partial absence of places where such liquors are openly
sold.
ALFRED SWINEFORD, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA TO THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR 14–15 (1885). He expressed little optimism:
The law in that regard is practically inoperative, and I do not believe
that, with our extensive coast line, the utmost vigilance of the customs
official can prevent liquors from finding their way in the
Territory . . . but, though positive in the opinion that a stringent license
system would be much preferable, I shall, nevertheless, do all in my
power to enforce the law as I find it.
Id.
150. LYMAN KNAPP, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
1889 23 (1889).
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liquor to white people.”151
The following year Knapp bluntly stated: “The law prohibiting the
manufacture of intoxicating liquors in the Territory is a dead letter,
except in its application to the Indians.”152
In the subsequent year, the District Attorney wrote an appendix to
the Governor’s Report, to explain why he should not be blamed for this
state of affairs:
There are now, and for many years have been, within the
Territory, two or three breweries manufacturing and selling
beer for other purposes than those [medicinal, mechanical or
scientific] prescribed by the statutes. There are also many
persons openly engaged in selling intoxicating liquors contrary
to law. These facts I have laid before each grand jury, advising
them that it was their sworn duty to indict all such persons. Yet
in every instance they not only have refused to indict, but have
refused to hear any testimony on the subject whatever. Some of
these grand juries have been composed of the best
representative citizens of the Territory, yet the sentiment is so
universally against the enforcement of the present liquor laws
that no indictment can be had and no conviction secured except
where the liquor has been sold or given to a Native. In the
latter cases the sentiment of all the better classes of citizens is in
favor of a rigid enforcement of the law.153

151. Id. at 25.
152. LYMAN KNAPP, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
1890 6 (1890).
153. LYMAN KNAPP, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
1891 43 (1891). Governor Knapp, although not disputing that the task was
daunting, did criticize the district attorney for not trying a little harder. Noting
in the 1892 report that the federal district court and the commissioners’ courts
had tried sixty-one defendants charged with selling liquor to Indians, and no
defendants had been charged with selling liquor to non-Indians, the governor
was disinclined to believe that jurors would be so irresponsible “if an honest and
vigorous effort were made, if prosecutions were brought and pushed to issue
with the thoroughness which ought to characterize the actions of men intrusted
[sic] with the responsibilities of office.” LYMAN KNAPP, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR
OF ALASKA FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1892 15–16 (1892). Gov. Knapp was not alone in
his disappointment with the efforts of the district attorney; examiner Allan H.
Dougall wrote to the Attorney General, “[t]here is no excuse why [the district
attorney] allowed this iniquitous traffic to grow so and to gain such a foothold at
Chilcat [sic] as it now has.” However, Dougall also acknowledged “[t]here is no
use of relying upon finding indictments against [the bootleg dealers] before an
Alaska grand jury.” Apparently Dougall’s suggestion was that the district
attorney keep bringing lesser charges against them, in the hopes of “exhausting
their ability to give bond.” Letter from Examiner Dougall to the Attorney
General (July 25, 1892), included in ALASKA BOUNDARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. II 413
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There were many reasons for the failure of the 1884 prohibition
law.154 Certainly Alaska’s huge coastline, remote communities, and
scarce enforcement resources played a role, as did tensions between the
various officials of the civil government—the customs agents (given
responsibility for preventing importation and reporting to the Secretary
of the Treasury), the district attorney (responsible for prosecuting
violators, reporting to the Attorney General), and the governor (given
overall responsibility but little authority, reporting to the Secretary of
the Interior). The major theme of this era was the fact that the Territory’s
white citizens were unwilling to enforce any alcohol bans as to
themselves, while willing to enforce the ban on sales to Natives. Alaska
was de jure completely dry, but de facto adhering to the Indian liquor
laws.
Congress itself reinforced this in some respects, by treating Alaska
as liquor law Indian country during this era. Starting in 1887, for
example, Congress appropriated money for the hiring of Indian police
“to be employed in maintaining order and prohibiting illegal traffic in
liquor on the several Indian reservations, and within the Territory of
Alaska.”155
By 1899, Congress was ready to call Alaska’s first prohibition to an
end. But in the meantime, dicta in some court opinions raised the issue
of whether the 1884 Act should have been read to have repealed the
Seveloff fix.
H.

1886-1892: In Pari Materia Versus Repeal by Implication, Round
Two

Did the liquor provision of the 1884 District Organic Act repeal the
1873 Seveloff fix? It certainly did not do so explicitly. Indeed, the Seveloff
fix continued to play a key role in several post-1884 cases, each
reiterating the Waters v. Campbell reasoning that the 1873 enactment
demonstrated that Alaska was not full-fledged Indian country, but
Indian country only for purposes of the FILL.156
(1903).
154. See generally LARRY ARTHUR SPARKS, THE FAILURE OF PROHIBITION IN
ALASKA: 1884-1900 (1974), available at http://www.skepticalthayne.com/
prohibition.pdf.
155. 24 Stat. 463-64 (1867). Similar appropriations were continued as late as
1918, 47 Stat. 677.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 29 F. 202, 203 (D. Alaska 1886) (noting
that the court had previously held that Alaska was considered Indian country
only in section 1955 of the Act of July, 1868, sections 20 and 21 of the Intercourse
Act of 1834, and section 14 of the Act of May, 1884); Kie v. United States, 27 F.
351, 352–53 (C.C. D. Or. 1886) (“Alaska is not to be considered ‘Indian country,’
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In 1886, however, the opinion in United States v. Nelson, raised the
possibility that § 14 of the Alaska District Organic Act may have
impliedly repealed the Seveloff fix.157 Nelson was prosecuted for violating
the liquor law prohibition in § 14 of the 1884 Act. The opponents of the
1884 Act made his defense something of a test case, as he argued that §
14 was unconstitutional, and violated the fundamental principles of free
government because “Congress, in its peculiar relation to Alaska, and
with the restricted power it possesses in regard thereto, has no
constitutional right to enact a prohibitory liquor law for this territory.”158
Most of Alaska District Court Judge Dawson’s opinion in Nelson
refuted that premise with a lengthy discussion of Congressional
authority over newly acquired territory, concluding that the defendants
could be convicted and punished under § 14 of the 1886 enactment.159
Judge Dawson briefly discussed fitting together the three existing
liquor laws (which he enumerated as section 4 of the 1868 Alaska Act,
section 1 of the 1868 Act as amended by the 1873 Seveloff fix, and section
14 of the 1884 District Organic Act).160 Portions of this discussion reflect
an assumption that the later act should repeal its predecessors,161 but
other portions reflect a preference for reading the statutes in pari
materia.162 Ultimately, since the arguments before him did not concern
only so far as concerns the introduction and disposition of spirituous liquors
therein.”); In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327, 328 (D. Alaska 1886) (“Only as to the
prohibited commerce mentioned in the sections referred to, can Alaska be
regarded as Indian country.”).
157. Nelson, 29 F. at 206.
158. Id. at 203. Governor Swineford mentioned the Nelson case, albeit not by
name, in his 1885 report, noting that several indictments for liquor trafficking
had been brought, and the defendants all combined to focus their efforts on one
test case (Nelson) in which it was argued that the law was void and
unenforceable. The district court had overruled the demurrer, and the defendant
had taken the case up on writ of error to the Circuit Court for the District of
Oregon, where the matter remained at the time Swineford wrote his report.
Notwithstanding the trial court’s decision, “[i]n the meantime there is no
diminution in the quantity of liquors being smuggled into the Territory, nor in
the number of places where it is openly sold.” ALFRED SWINEFORD, REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR OF ALASKA TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 46 (1886).Governor
Swineford advocated for the repeal of section 14, to be replaced by a strictly
regulated licensing system. Id.
159. See generally Nelson, 29 F. at 202-06.
160. Nelson, 29 F. at 206.
161. Id. (“[W]e may reasonably conclude that section 14 of the act of May,
1884, was intended to cover the whole of the subject embraced in sections 20 and
21 of the intercourse laws of 1834, as extended to and made applicable to
Alaska.”).
162. Id. at 206–07 (“It should be borne in mind that the various acts of
congress in relation to the subject now under consideration are in pari materia, all
relating to the same subject-matter, and are to be taken and examined together,
in order to ascertain the legislative intent”).
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the legislation from 1868 or 1873, any pronouncements on those laws
were no more than dicta.163
Nelson went up on writ of error to the Circuit Court before Judge
Deady, who upheld Judge Dawson’s conclusion as to Congressional
authority. Judge Deady also wrote that, as § 14 covered the whole
ground, the most reasonable conclusion would be that it superseded
prior liquor laws.164 He also wrote, however, that “no particular
question was made on the argument as to the scope and effect of the
act,”165 thereby explicitly acknowledging what can only be inferred from
Judge Dawson’s opinion, that this was not an issue before the court.
United States v. Warwick166 repeated this dicta, although it was no
more necessary to a ruling in that case than it had been in Nelson.
Warwick had been indicted for selling liquor to two Natives, under
Oregon Code § 669 (which the prosecutor presumably felt applied in
Alaska through § 7 of the 1884 Act). The defendant’s argument was that
§ 669 had no application in Alaska since § 14 of the Organic Act fully
covered the subject.167 Judge Truitt essentially ruled that the indictment
was valid because, either way, there was an enforceable law prohibiting
the defendants’ actions. He did note that Judge Deady stated that the
1884 Act had repealed prior alcohol laws “at least as to the portions in
conflict or subject fully covered by the later law.”168 But he nonetheless
163. Judge Dawson elsewhere expressed caution about reading too much
into the 1884 Act:
It is lamentably true that the act of Congress of May 17, 1884, known as
the ‘Organic Act,’ establishing a civil government for Alaska, is
unsurpassed for uncertainty. The context and the whole body of the act
indicate a want of that consideration which should always characterize
an act of Congress establishing a civil government for the people
inhabiting newly acquired territory. In the annals of American
legislation, this act stands glaringly and conspicuously forth as a
stupendous piece of stupidity. It is, indeed, difficult for the court to sift
from its incongruous and ambiguous provisions anything that is
tangible to the common sense of mankind in relation to this question.
Myers v. Swineford, 1 Alaska 10, 12 (D. Alaska 1888). Indeed, about two weeks
after Nelson, in a separate case unreported except in the local newspaper, Judge
Dawson originally indicated he was inclined to rule that the provisions in the
1868 Act authorizing the President to prohibit arms and ammunition had been
impliedly repealed by § 14 of the 1884 Act (as he had stated in dicta in Nelson, 29
F. at 206), but after taking the matter under advisement overnight, concluded
that his original impression was incorrect and there was no implied repeal. The
Alaskan (Sitka), Vol I, No. 47, Saturday Sep. 25, 1886, p.2.
164. Nelson v. United States, 30 F. 112, 116 (C.C. D. Or. 1887).
165. Id.
166. 51 F. 280 (D. Alaska 1892).
167. Id. at 280.
168. Id. at 281. The 1884 Act had no provision corresponding to the passage
in FILL giving the authority to (or imposing a duty on) an Indian or federal
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held the indictment valid: even if the defense argument about the
inapplicability of § 669 was accepted, the sale of liquor was still illegal
under the 1884 Act, regardless of whether the vendee was a white man
or an Indian,” and the language in the indictment that the buyers were
Indian women would be taken as descriptive, or surplusage.169 As in
Nelson itself, there was no issue or argument in Warwick over whether a
prosecution might have been brought under the 1873 Act, so any
pronouncements on that question were dicta.170
Had the issue been presented to the court, presumably whichever
side argued for an in pari materia interpretation would have pointed out
the rule disfavoring repeal by implication, which was as wellestablished a canon of construction in that era as it is today.171
Still, those passages from Nelson and Warwick, even as dicta, might
have left the Seveloff fix in something of a limbo. As discussed in the next
section, the liquor prohibition in § 14 of the Organic Act was repealed
before the turn of the century. In fact, of the three statutes Judge Dawson
listed in his Nelson opinion, two were explicitly repealed, leaving the
Seveloff fix as the sole survivor.
I.

1899: The Explicit Repeal of the Implied Repealer, the End of the
First Prohibition, and the Era of the High License

These repeals were a small part of a much larger effort to provide
Alaska with its own criminal and civil codes. Up to now, Oregon’s laws
had largely applied through the one-sentence invocation in the 1884
Act.172 The new criminal code (enacted in 1899) and the new civil code
(1900) were largely derived from the existing Oregon codes, but would
now be Alaska’s own.173 The repeal of the liquor prohibition in § 14 of
official to destroy liquor, so even if there had been an implied repeal of some
provisions of the earlier law, that particular component was neither in conflict
with nor fully covered by the later law.
169. Id.
170. See also In re Moore, 66 F. 947, 952 (D. Alaska 1895).
171. “A repeal by implication is not favored. The leaning of the courts is
against the doctrine, if it be possible to reconcile the two acts of the Legislature
together.” McCool v. Smith, 66 U.S. 459, 470–71 (1862) (citations omitted).
It is well settled that repeals by implication are not to be favored; and
where two statutes cover, in whole or in part, the same matter, and are
not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty of the court—no purpose to
repeal being clearly expressed or indicated—is, if possible, to give effect
to both.
United States v. Healey, 160 U.S. 136, 147 (1895).
172. Alaska District Organic Act, ch. 53, §7, 23 Stat. 24, 25–26. See supra text
accompanying note 147.
173. See generally F. Brown, The Sources of the Alaska and Oregon Codes, Part II,
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the 1884 Act, effectively ending race-neutral prohibition in Alaska, was
one of the most hotly debated aspects of the bills creating the new
codes.174
In the end, the 1899 enactment explicitly repealed Section 1955 of
the Revised Statutes (derived from § 4 of the 1868 Act) and the liquor
prohibition in § 14 of the 1884 Act.175 Under Nelson’s in pari materia
reading, then, Congress, by repealing the formerly pre-eminent § 14 of
the 1884 Act, as well § 4 of the 1868 Act, left the 1873 Seveloff fix in place
as the last statute standing. Even assuming arguendo that § 14 of the 1884
Act had by implication repealed the Seveloff fix, the repeal effectively
reinstated it. At common law, the repeal of a statute which had repealed
a prior statute reinstated the prior statute.176
The common law was applicable to Alaska as of 1899 on two
counts. First, Congress as part of the 1884 Act had incorporated the
general laws of the State of Oregon to be the laws of the District of

2 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 87 (1973).
174. See id. at 93, 96, 101–02.
175. “Section nineteen hundred and fifty-five of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, and all that part of section fourteen of ‘An Act providing a civil
government for Alaska,’ approved May seventeenth, eighteen hundred and
eighty-four, after the word ‘provided,’ is hereby repealed.” Act of Mar. 3, 1899,
ch. 429, § 142, 30 Stat. 1253, 1274 [hereafter “Carter Code”]. Recall that section 14
of the 1884 Act had read,
That the provisions of chapter 3, tit. 23, of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, relating to the unorganized territory of Alaska, shall
remain in full force, except as herein specially otherwise provided; and
the importation, manufacture, and sale of intoxicating liquors in said
district, except for medicinal, mechanical, and scientific purposes, is
hereby prohibited, under the penalties which are provided in section
1955 of the Revised Statutes for the wrongful importation of distilled
spirits. And the president of the United States shall make such
regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
Alaska District Organic Act § 14. Although there are two appearances of the
word “provided,” the intent of the legislation was clearly to eliminate the former
broad prohibition on liquor acquisition by all ethnicities, so the deletion was to
follow the first “provided.” See Brown, supra note 173, at 93, 101.
176. “Under the common law rules of interpretation, the repeal of a repealing
statute revives the original enactment where such repeal is accomplished by
express provision.” 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23:32 (7th ed.).
Most states have statutorily reversed that rule: “[t]he majority of the jurisdictions
in the United States have enacted general interpretive provisions to the effect
that the repeal of a repealing statute does not revive the original statute.” Id.
Alaska eventually did so, but not until 1955. SLA First Extraordinary Session
1955, ch. 4. This added to what was then ACLA 1949 § 19-1-1, the sentence
“When any act repealing a former act, section, or provision shall be itself
repealed, such repeal shall not be construed to revive such former act, section, or
provision unless it shall be expressly so provided.” This subsequently became
ALASKA STAT. § 01.010.100(c) (2012).
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Alaska,177 and Oregon had accepted the common law as far back as
1844.178 Second, Congress itself, in the same 1899 legislation which
repealed § 1955 of the Revised Statutes and the liquor provisions of § 14
of the 1884 organic act, explicitly made the common law applicable in
Alaska.179
Thus, whatever the tension imposed on the Seveloff Fix by § 14 of
the 1884 Act, the 1899 legislation resolved that. The Seveloff Fix had
survived the 1884 District Organic Act.
Beyond that, Congress simultaneously included in the new code an
Alaska version of an Oregon statute prohibiting sales of alcohol to
Natives.
Section 142 of what became known as Alaska’s “Carter Code,”180
made it a crime, punishable by two to six months incarceration or a fine
of $100 to $500, to “sell, barter or give to any Indian or half-breed who
lives and associates with Indians any firearms or ammunition therefore
whatever, or any spirituous, malt, or vinous liquor,” without the
authority of the United States or some authorized officer thereof.181 This
was imported from the Laws of Oregon, which had had some version of
this prohibition since 1843, and which had had this specific provision
since 1864 when it was enacted as part of Oregon’s “Deady Code.”182
177. Alaska District Organic Act § 7.
178. Brown, supra note 173, at 98–99 n.51.
179. Id. at 97–100. As Brown relates, the criminal provision was enacted in
1899, and a parallel provision receiving the common law was included in the
civil code enactment Congress adopted the following year. Act of June 6, 1900,
ch. 786, § 367, 31 Stat. 321. The two reception provisions (with minor
amendments) remained in Alaska’s codes until statehood. ACLA 1949 §§ 2-1-2,
65-1-3 (1949, Supp. 1959). Following statehood, they were combined into a
unitary reception statute, still found at ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.010 (2012).
180. Named for Montana Senator Thomas H. Carter, who played a
significant role in getting the criminal and civil codes drafted and enacted. See
Brown, supra note 173, at 92, 94–95, 102–103.
181. Carter Code, ch. 429, § 142, 30 Stat. 1253, 1274.
182. A prohibition on the sale of liquor to Indians was enacted by Oregon’s
“provisional” legislature in 1843, based on the parallel provision of the Iowa
Code as of 1838-39, part of what became known as Oregon’s “Little Blue Book,”
and also enacted by Oregon’s territorial legislature in 1849, based on the revised
laws of Iowa of 1843, part of what became known as Oregon’s “Big Blue Book.”
See L. Harris, History of the Oregon Code, 1 ORE. L. REV. 129, 136, 187 (1922); A.
Beardsley, Code Making in Early Oregon, 23 ORE. L. REV. 22, 33 (1943).
A comprehensive recodification was undertaken by Matthew Deady and
enacted by the legislature in 1864 (Laws Oregon, Oct. 19, 1864). Harris, supra, at
200–215; Beardsley, supra, at 49–55. This included an updated prohibition on
selling liquor to Indians, in the Deady Code of 1864 at § 654. Subsequent
compilations became known as the “Deady and [Lafayette] Lane” Laws of 1872
(in which the Indian prohibition was in § 669); and Hill’s Annotated Laws of
Oregon of 1887, and second edition of 1892 (in both of which the Indian
prohibition was in § 1891). See Harris, supra, at 207; Beardsley, supra, at 53–54.
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The final sentence of Carter Criminal Code § 142 repealed the fullscale prohibition provision of § 7 the 1884 Alaska District Organic Act,183
thereby loosening the alcohol regime in Alaska for sales to non-Indians.
This liberalization was the one of most controversial provisions in the
bill, as the growing prohibitionist movement saw this change as a step in
the wrong direction.184
Opponents argued that repealing R.S. 1955 and § 14 of the 1884 Act
provision would, aside from the ban on conveyance to Indians, leave
alcohol within Alaska completely unregulated.185 A compromise “high
license” provision was proposed, setting substantial license fees for
alcohol businesses, and including a “local option” provision.186 The
compromise was eventually agreed to187 and the bill passed.188
This 1899 compromise, while repealing § 14 of the 1884 enactment’s
outright ban, maintained a general rule that alcohol was not to be
permitted in the district,189 but also created a cumbersome exception
under which alcohol would be allowed within certain local-option-type
enclaves.190 A license for liquor required the applicant to show:
to the satisfaction of the court that a majority of the white male
and female residents over the age of eighteen years other than
Indians within two miles of the place where intoxicating liquor
is to be manufactured, bartered, sold and exchanged . . . have,
in good faith, consented to the manufacture, barter, sale and

183. Carter Code § 142.
184. See Brown, supra note 173, at 93, 96, 101–102.
185. Rep. Moody commented:
In other words, except in the sale of intoxicating liquors to Indians,
there is established, absolutely, freedom in the sale of liquor in the
Territory of Alaska . . . I do not believe that there is any place where
intoxicating liquors are sold without the restriction of public legislation
of any kind. If it may be found, it certainly can not be found in any one
of the States of the union, or in any one of the Territories of the Union.
32 CONG. REC. 383 (1899) (statement of Rep. Moody).
186. 32 CONG. REC. 586 (1899) (offered by Mr. Warner as an amendment to a
pending amendment, ruled out of order); 32 CONG. REC. 587 (1899) (re-offered by
Mr. Warner as a direct amendment to the bill).
187. 32 CONG. REC. 594 (1899).
188. 32 CONG. REC. 597 (1899); see Brown, supra note 173, at 93, 101.
189. “That no person, corporation, or company shall sell, offer for sale, or
keep for sale, traffic in, barter, or exchange for goods in said District of Alaska
any intoxicating liquors, except as hereinafter provided.” Carter Code Criminal,
ch. 429, § 462, 30 Stat. 1253–1343, 1337 (1899).
190. See id. § 464 (limiting the distribution of liquor licenses to areas where
the majority of whites over the age of eighteen within two miles of the
distribution point have agreed to the manufacture, sale, exchange, etc. of liquor).
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exchange . . . of the same.191
Licensees were not allowed to provide liquor “to any minor, Indian, or
intoxicated person, or to a habitual drunkard.”192
One question to be addressed at this juncture is whether Carter
Code § 142 was intended to supersede the extension of the general
federal Indian liquor laws under the Seveloff fix.193 Certainly § 142, which
explicitly repealed the liquor provisions of § 7 of the 1884 Act and
repealed § 1955 of the Revised Statutes, did not contain any parallel
repeal of the 1873 Seveloff Fix. But there is another point indicating that
the Seveloff Fix and the Carter Code were intended to function in pari
materia.
As noted above, § 142, like most of the Carter Code, was derived
from the Oregon Code of the time.194 Congress’s intent in 1899 was not
just to copy the text of Oregon’s statutes, but also to incorporate pre1899 court rulings from Oregon interpreting those statutes.195 Alaska’s
territorial court rulings recognized and adopted this incorporation of
Oregon case law interpreting the parallel Oregon statutes,196 as did the

191. Id.
192. Id. § 466.
193. No court held or implied that the Carter Code provision repealed the
Seveloff Fix, explicitly or implicitly. Years later, however, a 1937 opinion by
Acting Solicitor Kirgis took the view that Carter Code § 142 (which by 1937 had
become § 4963 of Compiled Laws of Alaska 1933) reflected an assumption that
other FILL (specifically 25 U.S.C. § 241) were inapplicable in Alaska. The
Protection of Indians and other Natives of Alaska from Liquor Traffic, 56 I.D.
137 (1937). That Solicitor’s Opinion was later overturned (see Liquor Problems in
‘Indian Country’ in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t of the Interior, M-36712 (Sept.
26, 1967)), so may not be of any continuing consequence. See infra notes 235–241.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 173–74.
195. This came up at several points in the debate:
Mr. Maddox: Do I understand the gentlemen to say that if we adopt this
section of the bill we also adopt the construction given to it by the
supreme court of that State?
Mr. Warner: My understanding is that when you adopt a statute of a
State which has been passed upon by the supreme court of that State,
you thereby adopt such construction.
32 CONG. REC. 422 (1899). “I will say to the gentleman from Arizona that this bill
is in substance simply a codification of the laws of Oregon; and along with those
laws will go the construction which the courts of Oregon have for many years
applied to these statutes.” 32 CONG. REC. 388 (1899) (remarks of Rep. Gibson),
quoted in Brown, supra note 173, at 95–96. See also id. at 100–01 (“Members of
Congress knew whose law they chose for Alaska, and anticipated that older case
law from the pre-adoption jurisdictions would follow the statutes to Alaska.”).
196. See Bordenelli v. United States, 233 F.2d 120, 124 (9th Cir. 1956) (“A
salient circumstance is the fact that the laws of the State of Oregon have been
adopted as the pattern for the laws of Alaska since the organization of the
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Alaska Supreme Court after statehood.197
Thus, the question of whether Carter Code § 142 meant that the
general federal Indian liquor laws no longer extended to Alaska is best
assessed by examining whether § 142’s ancestral Oregon provision
meant that the general FILL no longer extended to Oregon (recalling
that the Tom ruling established that the 1850 Oregon Act had extended
those liquor laws to Oregon).
But the Oregon case law instead reflected the opposite view, that
both the Oregon statute and the FILL were in effect. In 1855, Chief
Justice Williams of the Oregon Territorial Supreme Court had decided
that both the federal Indian liquor laws from 1834 and the Territorial
Indian liquor law from 1854 were in effect in Oregon.198 Reciprocally,
Oregon’s federal courts continued to hear prosecutions under the
general federal Indian liquor laws after 1864 (when the Deady Code
enacted the Oregon Territorial provision in § 654) and before 1899 (when
Congress cloned Carter Code § 142 from Deady Code § 654); and still
further, Federal District Court Judge Matthew Deady heard these
cases.199 Deady had reason to know what was in the Oregon Territorial
Code, not only from his tenure on the Oregon Territorial Supreme
Court, but also because he had been largely responsible for the contents
of the 1864 Oregon Code, for good reason called the “Deady Code.”200
All these rulings indicate that the Oregon courts and federal courts
regarded the general federal Indian liquor laws as applicable in Oregon
notwithstanding the parallel application of Deady Code § 654 (and later
Hill’s Annotated code § 1891).201 Congress’s intent that the Carter Code
§142, derived from that provision, be interpreted consistently with

territory. It seems plausible then that Congress, in providing for regulation of
the liquor traffic and licensing in accordance with the tradition, envisaged a
control system like that of Oregon”).
197. See Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 207 (Alaska 1962) (“[A] statute
adopted from another state, which has been construed by that state’s highest
court, is presumed to be adopted with the construction thus placed upon it.”).
198. Territory v. Coleman, 1 Or. 191, 192 (Or. 1855).
199. United States v. Shaw-Mux, 27 F. Cas. 1049, 1049 (D. Or. 1873) (No.
16,268); United States v. Winslow, 28 F. Cas. 737, 737 (D. Or. 1875) (No. 16,742).
200. Harris, supra note 182, at 215 (“To Matthew P. Deady more than to any
other single person is due the credit for the writing of all that body of laws
which was enacted in 1862 and in 1864, and for nearly sixty years has served the
people of the great commonwealth of Oregon.”); Beardsley, supra note 182, at 52
(“In the preparation of the two Deady codes, Judge Deady was nominally
assisted by others, but their efforts were addressed to the legislature, while he
did the actual work of preparation, much of it without even the assistance of an
amanuensis.”).
201. See, e.g., Coleman, 1 Or. at 191; Shaw-Mux, 27 F. Cas. at 1049; Winslow, 28
F. Cas. at 737.
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Oregon case law would mean that § 142 did not reflect any assumption
that the federal Indian liquor laws were inapplicable in Alaska.
Although there were some differences between Carter Code § 142
and the Seveloff fix legislation,202 Carter Code § 142 was essentially a
“federal Indian liquor law” in its own right. It was a congressionallyenacted statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to Natives and, although
contained in a Code that consisted mainly of laws passed pursuant to
Congressional authority over Territories under Article IV, § 3 of the
Constitution,203 § 142 itself drew on congressional authority under the
Indian Commerce Clause. In that sense, even if Carter Code § 142 had
completely supplanted the Seveloff fix, it still would have maintained
Alaska’s status as Indian country solely for purposes of prohibiting
liquor transactions with Indians.
In 1909, Congress amended Carter Code § 142 to increase the
possible sentence to two years, limit its scope to liquor by removing
firearms, and define “Indian” to exclude citizens of the United States.204
(“Indian” now included “the aboriginal races inhabiting Alaska when
annexed to the United States, and their descendants of the whole or half
blood, who have not become citizens of the United States.”205) These
changes brought the Carter Code into closer alignment with the other
federal Indian liquor laws.
Thus, as of the first decade of the twentieth century, the Seveloff Fix
was still unrepealed, and sale of alcohol to Natives in Alaska was still
illegal. Shortly afterwards, an Alaska Territorial Legislature was
congressionally authorized and, although its authority over alcohol was
quite limited, it began to play a role in the changing alcohol landscape.
202. RS 2139 (one of the successor provisions to sections 20 and 21 of the 1834
Trade and Intercourse Act), applicable to Alaska through the Seveloff fix, had a
longer incarceration period (up to two years) and smaller fine (up to $300) than
those in § 142 of the Carter Code (incarceration of up to six months, fine of up to
$500). Carter Code Criminal, ch. 429, § 142, 30 Stat. 1253, 1274 (1899). Also,
Carter Code § 142 encompassed firearms, which the Seveloff Fix did not, and the
Seveloff Fix called on individual Indians to seize and destroy liquor, which the
Carter Code § 142 did not.
203. U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3 (“The congress shall have power to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property of the United States.”).
204. Act of Feb. 6, 1909, ch. 80, § 9, 35 Stat. 603.
205. Id.; see In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 509 (1905) (legalizing the sale of liquor to
an Indian who had attained United States citizenship through receiving a patent
to an Indian allotment). Although the United States Supreme Court in 1915
overruled Heff and held that granting citizenship did not abrogate tribal
relations and did not take Indians out of the working of the general federal
Indian liquor laws, United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1915), Congress in
1924 mooted any remaining distinctions between citizens and non-citizens by
conferring citizenship on all Indians. Snyder Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
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1912: From District to Territory

In the 1912 Alaska Territorial Organic Act Congress granted Alaska
its own legislature, with somewhat circumscribed authority, to meet in
sixty-day sessions every two years.206 Congress limited the newly
created legislature’s authority, excluding alcohol from the scope of that
authority: “nor shall spirituous or intoxicating liquors be manufactured
or sold, except under such regulations and restrictions as Congress shall
provide.”207
Notwithstanding Congress’s reservation of that power to itself,
Alaska’s Second Territorial Legislature in 1915 enacted an amendment
to what had been §142 of the Carter Code, and was at that point found
in § 2022 of the 1913 Complied Laws of Alaska (1913 CLA).
The Territorial Legislature sought to overrule a 1913 Ninth Circuit
decision. Lott v. United States208 raised the question of whether an Indian
attempting to purchase alcohol should be subject to indictment and
punishable as an accomplice for soliciting, inciting, or abetting the seller
to violate Carter Code § 142.209 The prosecution argued for this result,
relying on the fact that Congress in 1909 had effectively changed a
violation of Carter Code § 142 from a misdemeanor to a felony210 and,
coupling that with the 1899 enactment adopting the common law of
England for Alaska,211 invoked the common-law rule that abettors of
felonies could be prosecuted.212 But the Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument, analogizing § 142 to other federal Indian liquor laws and
citing the “universal ruling of the courts that under laws prohibiting the
sale of intoxicating liquors the purchaser committed no offense,” and
holding that Congress would have had to express this intent explicitly to
achieve that result.213
In response to Lott, the Territorial Legislature’s 1915 enactment
amended § 2022 by adding a provision criminalizing an Indian for
“wrongfully and willfully solicit[ing], incit[ing] or induc[ing] any person
to furnish him or her with [alcohol],” punishable by the same
sanctions.214 Simultaneously, the legislation removed the reference to

206. Territorial Organic Act, ch. 387, 37 Stat. 512 (1912).
207. Id. § 9.
208. 205 F. 28 (9th Cir. 1913).
209. Id. at 31.
210. See supra text accompanying note 204.
211. Carter Code Criminal, ch. 429, § 218, 30 Stat. 1253, 1285 (1899). See supra
text accompanying note 189; see also Brown, supra note 173, at 97–99.
212. Lott, 205 F. at 31.
213. Id. 31–32.
214. 1915 Alaska Sessions Laws ch. 51
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“half-blood,”215 removed the definition of “Indian,”216 and downgraded
the crime back from a felony to a misdemeanor.217
However, these amendments, as laws regarding how spirituous
liquors were to be sold, likely exceeded the scope of authority Congress
had delegated to the Territorial Legislature.218
Thus, after 1915, the status of § 2022 of the 1913 CLA, formerly
Carter Code § 142, may have been questionable. It is unclear whether
prosecutions should have been brought under § 2022 as last amended by
Congress in 1909, or under the new § 2022 as amended by the Territorial
Legislature in 1915. Most defendants presumably preferred the latter, as
the penalties after the 1915 legislation were less severe; but Alaska
Natives who might be prosecuted for attempting to buy alcohol
presumably preferred the former, under which their actions did not
constitute a crime.
These issues were left unresolved, as Alaska led the rest of the
country into prohibition, and new laws joined the overlapping layers of
alcohol regulation in Alaska.
K.

1917: The “Bone Dry” Law and Alaska’s Second Prohibition

After losing the battle over the Carter Code in 1899, the temperance
forces regrouped. The 1915 Alaska Territorial legislature put a
referendum before the voters on whether Alaska should ask Congress to
make it a dry territory.219 A large margin approved this measure.220 In
response, Congress in 1917 enacted “An Act to prohibit the manufacture
or sale of alcoholic liquors in the Territory of Alaska.”221
Later in 1917, Congress voted to put the Eighteenth Amendment

215. Id.
216. Id. This definition had excluded citizens, so the intent was to encompass
citizen and non-citizen Indians.
217. Id. A first offense was punishable by a fine of between $120 and $500, or
incarceration for 60 to 250 days. Subsequent offenses incurred fines of between
$240 to $1000, and incarceration for four months to one year. (Prior to the
amendment, the fine was $100 to $500, and the incarceration term up to two
years.).
218. See supra text accompanying note 207.
219. 1915 Alaska Sessions Laws, ch. 7.
220. Alaska Natives were not yet citizens, but at least some apparently voted
in this election. See EVANGELINE ATWOOD, FRONTIER POLITICS: ALASKA’S JAMES
WICKERSHAM 310 (1979). Also voting were Alaska’s women residents and,
although they only made up about 20% of the vote, their concerted campaigning
on the issue helped pass the initiative with a majority of 62%. See M. Ehrlander,
The Paradox of Alaska’s 1916 Alcohol Referendum: A Dry Vote within a Frontier
Alcohol Culture, 102 PAC. NW. Q. 29, 39 (2011).
221. Act of Feb. 14, 1917, ch. 53, 39 Stat. 903.
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before the States for ratification (following Alaska’s lead by placing the
amendment before each state’s voters, rather than each state’s
legislature). After ratification in December 1918, the United States
followed Alaska into legally enforced temperance as Congress passed
the National Prohibition Act (the “Volstead Act”).
Alaska thus faced an “implied repeal” question in some respects
parallel to those considered above for the Seveloff fix. Alaskans now had
two separate statutes criminalizing their possession of alcohol: Alaska’s
1917 Bone Dry law and the 1919 national Volstead Act.222 As the
Volstead Act had lesser penalties, criminal defendants charged under
the harsher Bone Dry law argued that it had been repealed by the
Volstead Act.
L.

1921: In Pari Materia Versus Repeal by Implication, Round Three

The 1921 Abbate v. United States223 case reached the issue of whether
the Volstead Act repealed the Bone Dry law. The Volstead Act actually
had an explicit repealer clause,224 to the extent of inconsistencies with
prior laws. The Ninth Circuit rejected that repealer argument, holding
that both statutes were in effect in Alaska.225
Further, the opinion indicated that the Bone Dry Law was in
accordance with the congressional history of treating Alaska as Indian
country for purposes of the federal Indian liquor laws:
Congress enacted the Bone Dry Law for Alaska, and 20 months
later it enacted the National Prohibition Act. In enacting the
latter Congress was adopting legislation for the whole United
States to carry out the provisions of the Eighteenth
Amendment. In enacting the Bone Dry Law, on the other hand,
Congress was pursuing its policy of prohibition in Indian
country. That policy as to Alaska was first manifested by
legislation enacted on July 27, 1868, for the prevention of the
importation and sale of intoxicating liquors in Alaska, the
222. Additionally, two statutes criminalized the conveyance of liquor to
Alaska Natives: § 2022 of the 1913 CLA, and R.S. 2139 as extended to Alaska in
1873. JOINT COMM. ON TERRITORIES OF THE SENATE & HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMPILED LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF ALASKA, S. DOC. NO. 62-1093, at 677–78
(1913).
223. 270 F. 735 (9th Cir. 1921).
224. “All provisions of law that are inconsistent with this act are repealed
only to the extent of such inconsistency and the regulations herein provided for
the manufacture or traffic in intoxicating liquor shall be construed as an addition
to existing laws.” National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, § 35, 41 Stat. 317,
quoted in Abbate, 270 F. at 735.
225. Abbate, 270 F. at 737.
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population of which was largely composed of Indians, and it
was continued without interruption until the enactment of the
Bone Dry Law of February 14, 1917. That act contains
provisions peculiarly applicable to Alaska, and which are more
drastic and far-reaching, and involve severer penalties for the
same offense, than do the provisions of the National
Prohibition Act.226
Abbate thus established the paramountcy of reading overlapping
liquor laws in pari materia with each other rather than determining
which provisions had impliedly repealed which earlier provisions.
Abbate did not mention the 1873 Seveloff fix, but it is impossible to read
Abbate and conclude that the District Organic Act, the Carter Code, the
Bone Dry Law, or the Volstead Act would have repealed the Seveloff fix.
The Abbate opinion remained the controlling authority on the
simultaneous enforceability question in Alaska.227 However, the
references to “Indian country” in the opinion prompted concerns
echoing the Waters v. Campbell debate over whether Alaska was fullfledged Indian country. Territorial District Court Judge Ritchie in a 1923
case rejected this interpretation:
It was suggested in the argument by counsel for the defendant
in this case that the statement just quoted [“In enacting the
Bone Dry Law. . . Congress was pursuing its policy of
prohibition in Indian country”] amounted to a dictum that all
Alaska is Indian country. I do not think Judge Gilbert intended
to say that, nor is his statement susceptible of that construction
when the entire paragraph is read.228

226. Id. at 736.
227. Subsequent decisions made it clear that defendants might be prosecuted
under one statute or the other, but the same incident could not be prosecuted
under both. United States v. Ashworth, 7 Alaska 64, 70 (D. Alaska 1923). Also,
the Volstead Act’s heightened protections for issuance of warrants to search
private dwellings prevailed over the more general warrant standards of the
Alaska Bone Dry law. United States v. Berkeness, 16 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir. 1926).
228. United States v. Olsen, 6 Alaska 571, 573 (D. Alaska 1923). The opinion
impliedly recognizes that Indian country for liquor law purposes is not the same
as Indian country for general purposes; Judge Ritchie explained that the Abbate
court had correctly noted that the population of Alaska was largely Indian, and
that Congress had been pursuing its policy of prohibition in Indian country, but
this did not equate to a holding that Alaska generally was Indian country. Id. at
573. (But simultaneously he recognized that there were areas of full Indian
country within Alaska. “The territory is not Indian country, aside from Indian
reservations and lands owned by Indians, because they actually live upon
them.” Id. at 573–74.).
The Ninth Circuit subsequently refused to overrule Abbate, when invited to
do so on the basis that Abbate had wrongly concluded that Congress had been
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The relevant conclusions from this Bone Dry era are: (1) neither the
advent of prohibition nor its end repealed the Seveloff Fix; and (2)
overlapping liquor laws should be read as coexisting, with no implied
repeal judicially pronounced unless the two laws were impossible to
reconcile.
Alaska’s “second prohibition” ended in 1934.229 In 1933, Congress
passed the Blaine Act to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment and voided
the Volstead Act. In 1934, Congress repealed the Alaska Bone Dry
Law.230
M. 1934-1941: Post-Prohibition
What had been § 142 of the Carter Code, and later § 2022 of the
1913 Compiled Laws of Alaska, had now become § 4963 of the 1933
Compiled Laws of Alaska. Its text remained the same as it had been
following the 1915 Territorial Legislature’s amendment. It was a
misdemeanor for any person, without the authority of the United States,
to convey to any Indian any alcohol, and it was a misdemeanor for any
Indian to “wrongfully and willfully solicit, incite or induce any person
to furnish him or her with” the same.231
Beyond the narrow context of the federal Indian liquor laws, the
federal government was clarifying its policies as to Alaska Natives,
bringing their legal status closer to that of American Indians. After 1931,
the Alaskan responsibilities of the Office of Education were transferred
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.232 The Interior Department issued an
opinion in 1932 concluding that “no distinction has been or can be made
between the Indians and other Natives of Alaska so far as the laws and
relations of the United States are concerned.”233 The 1936 Alaska Indian
Reorganization Act was passed to give Alaska Native Communities
those opportunities that tribes in the lower 48 states had been afforded
pursuing its policy of prohibition in Indian country. “This may or may not have
been the purpose and reason for the enactment, but the law was at least enacted
to supply some local need, real or apparent, and the result is the same.”
Stanworth v. United States, 45 F.2d 158, 159 (9th Cir. 1930).
229. Act of Apr. 13, 1934, ch. 119, 48 Stat. 583.
230. In repealing the Alaska Bone Dry Act, Congress extended the authority
of the Alaska Territorial Legislature under the 1912 Territorial Act to encompass
alcohol. Pub. L. No. 73-158, § 2, 48 Stat. 583 (1934). It explicitly ratified a 1933
Territorial enactment (Territorial Enactment from 1933, SLA 1933, ch. 109)
creating a board of liquor control. Id. § 3. It repealed sections 462 to 478 of the
1899 Carter Code, id. § 4, which had contained the “high license” provisions. But
this did not mean that the Territory’s authority over liquor issues was unlimited.
231. Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 4963 (1933).
232. Sec’y of the Interior’s Order No. 494, Mar. 14, 1931.
233. Status of Alaska Natives, 53 L.D. 593, 605 (1932).
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under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.234
This was also the period during which Acting Solicitor Kirgis
opined that § 4963 of the 1933 CLA235 reflected an assumption that 25
U.S.C. 241236 was not applicable in Alaska. This opinion was eventually
overruled,237 and as noted above, Kirgis’s analysis failed to take into
account the interpretation of the Oregon predecessors to § 4963.238 But
there was yet another flaw in Kirgis’s analysis, in that the opinion stated,
“No reported decision has been found dealing with the application of
Section 241, Title 25, United States Code, to the Territory of Alaska.”239
However, there was reported case authority on that question: the Seveloff
case itself, and the subsequent United States v. Carr and Waters v.
Campbell decisions, though one would have to know that what was
housed in 25 U.S.C. § 241 as of 1937 had previously been section 20 of
the 1834 Act.240 The reasons Interior decided eventually to abandon
Kirgis’s opinion were based on other factors,241 but abandonment was
the proper course.
N.

1948: The New Indian Country Definitions
The new 1948 definition of “Indian Country” in 18 U.S.C. § 1151

234. DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN
LAWS, 384–87 (3d ed. 2012).
235. Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 4963 (1933). Section 4963 was the successor
to Carter Code § 142.
236. Part of the federal Indian liquor laws, a successor provision to section 20
of the 1834 Act.
237. See The Protection of Indians and other Natives of Alaska from Liquor
Traffic, supra note 193.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 193–99.
239. The Protection of Indians and other Natives of Alaska from Liquor
Traffic, supra note 193.
240. In fairness to Acting Solicitor Kirgis, legal research on Indian law issues
was quite difficult in 1937. “By the 1930s there was thus a fully developed
federal Indian law, including treaties, statutes, cases, and administrative
decisions. Yet, given the multiplicity of sources and their complexity, it was not
easily accessible . . . .” DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX M.
COHEN AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM 166 (2007). Felix
Cohen himself, writing in 1941 before the Kirgis opinion had been overruled,
treated Kirgis’s opinion as setting out Interior’s view, but did not regard that
view as limiting the potential for Alaska Tribes to enact their own liquor control
ordinances. He suggested that, rather than relying on federal enforcement, tribes
consider controlling the liquor traffic in organized Indian communities by
adopting measures for liquor control independent of the Territorial law. See Re
the Intoxicating Liquor Traffic Among Natives in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t
of the Interior, M-31324 (Aug. 14, 1941), available at http://thorpe.
ou.edu/sol_opinions/p1051-1075.html.
241. See Liquor Problems in ‘Indian Country’ in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of
Dep’t of the Interior, M-36712 (Sept. 26, 1967).
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became the cornerstone to determining whether and where “fullfledged” Indian country existed in Alaska and throughout the United
States. Of the three types of “Indian country” included in the definition,
reservations and allotments clearly were present in Alaska as of 1948.242
The first consideration of the implications of the new statutory
definition for Alaska arose in the alcohol context. In December 1948,
Solicitor Mastin G. White, while not explicitly overruling the Kirgis
opinion, noted that it had predated the 1948 statute defining Indian
country, and opined that the federal Indian liquor laws were applicable
to any federal reservations, including those in Alaska, and to nonreservation dependent Indian communities in Alaska as well.243 At the
time when Solicitor White was writing, Congress had not explicated in
the new code that “Indian country” for purposes of the federal Indian
liquor laws might have a different scope than the general definition (as
above, this occurred in 1949),244 so Solicitor White had no occasion to
consider that possibility. Still, the opinion is significant because it
recognized that there was no actual legal barrier to application of the
federal Indian liquor laws in Alaska, and implicitly acknowledged that
alcohol control issues in Alaska’s Native communities were as crucial as
for lower 48 tribes.
A later Solicitor’s opinion notes that, following Solicitor White’s
letter, consideration was given by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to
enforcement of the federal Indian liquor laws in Alaska, but the BIA
lacked sufficient personnel to do so.245
O.

1953: A Questionable End for Carter Code § 142

In 1953, the same year that Congress changed the federal Indian
liquor laws into a delegation of authority to states and tribes,246 Alaska’s
Territorial Legislature revamped its liquor laws, in several respects.
Most significantly, it repealed ACLA 1949 sec. 65-3-7, which had been
the successor to § 142 of the 1899 Carter Code.247 To the extent that the

242. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 234, at 81–112 (reservations), 113-164
(allotments).
243. See Liquor Problems in ‘Indian Country’ in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of
Dep’t of the Interior, M-36712 (Sept. 26, 1967), at 3 (quoting BIA Files 50082-1945126).
244. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 28, 63 Stat. 94 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1156 (2012)). See supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
245. See Liquor Problems in ‘Indian Country’ in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of
Dep’t of the Interior, M-36712 (Sept. 26, 1967), at 3 (quoting BIA Files 50082-1945126).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48.
247. 1953 Alaska Session Laws ch. 42. ACLA 1949 sec. 65-3-7 had been the
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the Seveloff fix was eclipsed by the first prohibition, by the Carter Code,
or by the second prohibition, all those enactments had now been
explicitly repealed.
The bill to effect that repeal (House Bill 102) was one of a quartet of
bills introduced to make significant changes to Alaska’s liquor laws.
The closely related House Bill 101, “An Act prescribing criminal
penalties for drunkenness and for selling or giving intoxicating liquor to
common drunkards,” indicates that its purpose was to replace the to-berepealed Indian-specific provision of ACLA § 65-13-7 with a race-neutral
prohibition on providing liquor to “common drunkards” of any
extraction. By contrast with House Bill 102, which passed with virtually
no debate,248 House Bill 101 was debated on the House Floor, where the
term “common drunkard” was replaced by “habitual drunkard,” then
an amendment was offered to replace that with “alcoholic,” then an
amendment to the amendment suggesting “chronic alcoholic,”
whereupon the bill was re-referred back to a committee for further
consideration, ultimately not getting a House Floor vote.249
House Bills 100 and 103, both of which did pass, were broader,
eliminating Alaska’s Territorial Liquor Control Board and delegating
much of its prior authority to the Territory’s municipalities, and many of
its prior duties to the District Courts.250 Later cases found this to fall
outside the Territorial Legislature’s congressionally-delegated
authority.251 The legislature in 1957 re-established the Territorial Liquor
Control Board and re-enacted most of those repealed laws, with some
amendments.252
Although repeal of § 65-3-7 also might have exceeded the
Territorial Legislature’s authority based on that same reasoning, there
was no challenge to that repeal, or attempts to re-enact that statute.
Assuming the validity of that repeal, the Seveloff Fix had effectively
outlasted the Carter Code.

successor to Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 4963 (1933) of the 1933 Compiled Laws
of Alaska, in turn the successor to section 2022 of the 1913 Compiled Laws of
Alaska, in turn the successor to section 142 of the 1899 Carter Code.
248. Alaska Territorial Leg., H. Journal, at 348, 405–06, 412–13, 743, 757, 763,
867 (Alaska 1953) (hereafter 1953 Alaska House Journal).
249. 1953 Alaska House Journal at 348, 377, 605–06, 638.
250. 1953 Alaska Session Laws chapters 43 (H.B. 103), 131 (H.B. 100).
251. See Bordenelli v. United States, 233 F.2d 120, 124 (9th Cir. 1956); Woo v.
City of Anchorage, 154 F. Supp. 944, 947 (D. Alaska 1957).
252. 1957 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 131.
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1957-1960: Full Indian Country and Full Statehood

The 1948 statutory definition of “Indian country” had ramifications
for Alaska beyond the federal Indian liquor laws, and developments in
the late 1950s took the discussion in that direction. The debates over the
next several decades focused on the existence vel non of “full” Indian
country in Alaska, rather than FILL Indian country. A 1957 case held
that the Tyonek reservation was “Indian country” within the meaning of
the 1948 definition, and the Territory could not prosecute a criminal case
for statutory rape within the reservation, because Congress had not
conferred authority upon the Territory to do so within “Indian
country.”253 Congress responded by extending P.L. 280254 to Alaska in
1958,255 adding the Territory of Alaska as a sixth mandatory P.L. 280
jurisdiction, in accord with the generally assimilationist polices of that
era. This ensured that the Territory had complete criminal and civil
jurisdiction within whatever areas of full “Indian country” might
eventually be found to exist within the Territory. For our purposes the
relevant point is that the extension of P.L. 280 to Alaska did not purport
to repeal the Seveloff fix.
Alaska’s Statehood Act was signed into law July 7, 1958256 and,
following approval by Alaska’s voters on August 26, 1958, President
Eisenhower signed the official declaration on January 3, 1959. Whatever
limits Congress had formerly imposed on the Territorial Legislature’s
authority over alcohol were left behind. But the Statehood Act did not
repeal the Seveloff fix, and Statehood in and of itself did not affect the
application of the federal Indian liquor laws. Any full-fledged “Indian
country” then in Alaska was subject to the provisos in the Alaska
Statehood Act § 4,257 and arguably the same was true of any “liquor law

253. In re McCord, 151 F. Supp. 132, 135 (D. Alaska 1957).
254. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 589 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)). This “PL 280” authority was
mandatory in five states (California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Wisconsin) and optional for other states. The optional provision was made
contingent on tribal consent in 1968. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82
Stat. 7 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1031 (2012)).
255. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1984)) (adding the Territory of Alaska to the five “mandatory”
PL 280 states).
256. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) (codified at
48 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)).
257. Id. § 4. (“[S]aid State and its people do agree and declare that they
forever disclaim all right and title to any lands or other property, (including
fishing rights), the right or title to which may be held by any Indians, Eskimos,
or Aleuts (hereinafter called natives) or is held by the United States in trust for
said natives . . . .”).
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only” Indian country. Alaska’s attainment of statehood did not
terminate congressional authority to declare (in the past or in the future)
parcels of land as “Indian country” within the new State.258 Statehood
neither enlarged nor diminished any Indian country, either “fullfledged” or “liquor only.”
Q.

1967-1968: the Federal Indian Liquor Laws Re-Recognized in
Alaska

In 1967, the Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs issued an opinion
reconsidering the 1937 Kirgis opinion noted above, and definitively
concluded that “the Indian liquor laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154 et seq., are
applicable to ‘Indian country’ in Alaska.”259 The new opinion listed
several reasons for rejecting the former Acting Solicitor’s opinion.260
Just as importantly, the opinion also noted that the 1953
restructuring of the federal liquor laws to delegate authority to tribes
would apply in Alaska:
Thus, if an organized native group does not elect to permit
liquor on its reserve or in its community, the Federal Indian
liquor laws still apply. If it votes for the conditional suspension
of such federal laws, acts in violation of either state or tribal
law are likewise in violation of Federal law.261
A follow-up memorandum in early 1968 addressed questions about
whether formation of an Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) Council
should be regarded as either necessary or sufficient to constitute a
dependent Indian community. There were Alaska Native communities

258. “The fact that the ceded territory is within the limits of Minnesota is a
mere incident; for the act of Congress imported into the treaty applies alike to all
Indian tribes occupying a particular country, whether within or without State
lines.” United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 (1876).
259. Liquor Problems in ‘Indian Country’ in Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t of
the Interior, M-36712 (Sept. 26, 1967).
260. Id. These included: (1) the 1899 “Carter Code” provision applied only to
non-citizen Indian purchases, whereas all Alaska Natives became citizens in
1924; (2) the territorial law into which the “Carter Code” provision had evolved
had been repealed; (3) the new “Indian country” definition had been enacted,
and Solicitor White had concluded in 1948 that this new definition encompassed
Gambell and Savoonga; and (4) the 1958 extension of P.L. 280 to Alaska
recognized the existence of “Indian country” in Alaska.
261. Id. The opinion notes that the natives were “desirous of having the
Federal exclusionary statutes enforced,” observes that the Law and Order
branch of the BIA had informally indicated its concurrence with the application
of the federal Indian liquor laws, and urges the Regional Solicitor to confer with
the local United States Attorney’s office, observing that that lack of BIA
enforcement personnel had been noted as a problem in 1948.
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which wanted liquor banned but had not formed an IRA Council; and
there were IRA organizations that had been formed in “mixed”
communities. The supplemental opinion posited that Alaska Native
communities should be able to exercise their alcohol authority without
having to form IRA Councils. As to the mixed communities question,
the opinion noted that at that point there were no IRA Councils seeking
to exercise alcohol authority in mixed communities, and suggested that
when such issues arose, they should be dealt with on a case-by-case
basis based on pragmatic considerations, and local need should
determine enforcement policy.262
The supplemental opinion also noted that the Arctic Slope Native
Association had passed a resolution purporting to exercise some
measure of alcohol jurisdiction. The opinion rejected the premise that
ASNA could be a Native community for liquor law purposes; it was up
to individual Native communities to determine their own course.263
These 1967 and 1968 opinions, although arising in the area of
federal Indian liquor law enforcement, looked primarily to the 1948
statutory definition of “full-fledged” Indian country. Their authors
would not have seen any need to discuss the possibility that Indian
country for purposes of the federal Indian liquor laws might be any
different than Indian country for general purposes, and they did not
discuss it. No necessity of tying their conclusions to a “FILL” rather than
full Indian country framework would arise for another thirty years.
Nevertheless, the Seveloff Fix had now survived the Kirgis opinion.
R.

1971-1986: ANCSA and Post-ANCSA Tribal Liquor Ordinances

The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) did not
purport to repeal the Seveloff fix.
ANCSA did revoke all existing reservations in Alaska except for
Metlakatla. Still, discussions of the application of the federal Indian
liquor laws in Alaska remained focused on “full” Indian country,
although it shifted away from the now-terminated reservations and
towards whether Native lands in Alaska constituted Indian country
under the “allotment” or “dependent Indian community” legs of the
general Indian country definition.
The Solicitor’s office considered post-ANCSA village alcohol
control authority in an October 1980 memorandum concerning a

262. Liquor Control, Indian communities, Alaska, Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t of
the Interior, M-36712 Supp. (Jan. 15, 1968).
263. Id.
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proposed liquor ordinance from the Village of Allakaket.264 Much of the
opinion concerns the view that, notwithstanding ANCSA’s revocation of
Alaska reservations outside Metlakatla, the phrase “dependent Indian
communities” in the 18 U.S.C. § 1151 definition might still fit Alaska
Native communities (a view which, under the interpretation of that
phrase adopted in the subsequent Venetie opinion, we now know will
not encompass ANCSA lands). The opinion additionally notes that
allotments also fall within the general statutory definition of “Indian
country,” a view that has survived the Venetie decision, which itself
noted that possibility.265 As to both allotments and dependent Indian
communities, the opinion considers the question of whether an Alaska
Native Village could have jurisdiction over alcohol outside a
“reservation,” as tribal authority over non-reservation lands is an
“unresolved issue,” but concludes that tribes can exercise delegated
federal authority under 25 U.S.C. § 1161 as to non-reservation lands, for
which the federal authority exists even though the authority of the tribe
itself might be questionable absent federal delegation.
The opinion notes several problems with the particular Allakaket
ordinance that had been submitted for Interior review. The ordinance
purported to apply a criminal penalty to all persons violating it; the
opinion notes the village would have to either limit the criminal
penalties to Indians and Alaska Natives (over whom the tribe could
exercise criminal jurisdiction) or change its enforcement to civil
mechanisms. The ordinance conveyed the impression that the tribe itself
would be enforcing the criminal penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 1154(a), which
would need to be changed as only federal authorities could enforce that
statute (noting that those federal authorities could of course prosecute
non-Natives as well as Natives). Adequate due process safeguards
should be set out in the ordinance itself because they would be required
by the Indian Civil Rights Act, and because the alternative of having
these rights set out in the tribal constitution was inapplicable to
Allakaket which lacked a written constitution. The opinion ended by
noting that resources to effect federal enforcement of the federal Indian
liquor laws, having been a problem in the 1940s and 1960s, would
presumably still be a problem in the 1980s, and should be discussed
with the local U.S. Attorney’s office.
There is no record that a revised ordinance for Allakaket was

264. Memorandum from Comm’r of Indian Affairs, Liquor Ordinance,
Village of Allakaket, Alaska, to Associate Solicitor for the Division of Indian
Affairs (Oct. 1, 1980).
265. Venetie Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.2.
(1998).
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certified and published by the Department of the Interior. Subsequently,
however, between 1983 and 1986, three Native villages (Chalkyitsik,
Minto, and Northway) had their alcohol ordinances certified and
published in the Federal Register by the Secretary of the Interior.266
Notably, the State of Alaska did not sue to challenge the ability of
these tribes to have their Indian country recognized for purposes of their
alcohol ordinances.
S.

1987-1998: Venetie, a Taxing Case

However, a tribe asking to have Indian country recognized for
purposes of tribal taxation was a different matter. In 1987, the State of
Alaska challenged tribes’ ability to have their “full” Indian country
status recognized for the purpose of imposing business taxes in Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,267 in which the State
eventually prevailed in 1998 before the United States Supreme Court.
This requires an assessment of whether the ruling and reasoning in
Venetie are harmonizable with the premise that Congress could, and did,
extend the federal Indian liquor laws to Alaska. For several reasons, the
answer is yes.
In Venetie, the Court only interpreted the tripartite definition of
full-fledged Indian country in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, not the alternate
provision for liquor-law-only Indian country found in Title 18. There
were no alcohol control issues before the Court in Venetie; the twelveword introduction to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 referencing the differing definition
of Indian country for liquor law purposes was so irrelevant to the
Court’s analysis that it was omitted from its quotation of that statute.268
Furthermore, the Court’s observation that “primary jurisdiction
over land that is Indian country rests with the Federal Government and
the Indian tribe inhabiting it, and not with the States”269 is true enough
of full Indian country, but not of FILL Indian country, in which the
States and Indian tribes both have authority to impose their own limits
on alcohol possession and transactions. The Court simply was not
contemplating the question of whether Alaska might contain Indian

266. See Village of Chalkyitsik, Alaska; Ordinance Prohibiting the
Introduction, Possession, and Sale of Intoxicating Beverages, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,378,
21,378 (May 12, 1983); Native Village of Northway; Ordinance Providing for the
Introduction, Possession and Sale of Intoxicating Beverages, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,195,
30,195 (June 30, 1983); Village of Minto Liquor Ordinance, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,779,
28,779 (Aug. 11, 1986).
267. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
268. Id. at 526–27.
269. Id. at 527 n.1.
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country for the limited purpose of the federal Indian liquor laws.
Interpreting the “dependent Indian communities” term in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 as a matter of first impression, the Court held that it referred to a
“limited category” of Indian lands satisfying a “set-aside” requirement
and a “superintendence” requirement.270 Venetie’s ANCSA lands did not
meet the “set-aside” requirement because ANCSA lands might
eventually be owned by non-Natives and could currently be used for
non-Indian purposes.271 They did not meet the “superintendence”
requirement because Venetie had received title to the transferred land in
fee simple.”272 In effect, the Venetie lands were not § 1151 Indian country
because they were fee-patented lands in what might eventually be a
non-Indian community. But “fee patented land in a non-Indian
community” is exactly that category of land which, under 18 U.S.C. §§
1154 and 1156, is federal Indian liquor law Indian country, if and only if
there is a treaty or statute extending the liquor laws thereto. So it is
entirely consistent with the Supreme Court’s characterization of ANCSA
lands in Venetie to recognize that a statute extending the Indian liquor
laws to any particular parcel of land needs to be given that effect, even if
that land is fee-patented land in a non-Indian community, or feepatented land in what may eventually become a non-Indian community.
Another passage in Venetie demonstrates the congruence of this
article’s thesis with that holding. The Court explained that “The federal
set-aside requirement also reflects the fact that because Congress has
plenary power over Indian affairs . . . some explicit action by
Congress . . . must be taken to create or to recognize Indian country.”273
The Seveloff fix, in creating FILL Indian country in Alaska, certainly
demonstrated explicit action by Congress, and Congress’s plenary
power over Indian affairs means that courts have to respect what
Congress has legislated and has not repealed.
The concluding passage in Venetie emphasized that the
“superintendence” which the Court would need to find in a “dependent
Indian community” conflicted with a statute like ANCSA that was
intended to promote self-determination and end paternalism.274 But, to

270. Id. at 527.
271. “Because Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own the
former Venetie Reservation, and because the Tribe is free to use it for non-Indian
purposes, we must conclude that the federal set-aside requirement is not met.”
Id. at 533.
272. Id. at 524. The Court, while acknowledging that the Pueblos of New
Mexico were owned by those tribes in fee simple, characterized that title as “not
fee simple title in the commonly understood sense of the term.” Id. at 528.
273. Id. at 531 n.6.
274. Id. at 534.
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find FILL Indian country, the courts need not look for dependence or
paternalism; they need only look for an explicit congressional
enactment. The federal Indian liquor laws over sixty years ago left
behind the dependence and paternalism that accompanied the original
enactment of the federal Indian liquor laws, and converted them into a
vehicle for promotion of tribal autonomy, by delegating authority to the
tribes to craft their own alcohol laws: “[I]n enacting [18 U.S.C.] § 1161,
Congress intended to recognize that Native Americans are not ‘weak
and defenseless,’ and are capable of making personal decisions about
alcohol consumption without special assistance from the Federal
Government.”275 Thus, eighteen years before ANCSA’s passage in 1971,
the federal Indian liquor laws had already discarded their prior
“wardship” and “paternalism” aspects that the Venetie opinion found
antithetical to ANCSA’s philosophy,276 and, by bestowing on tribes a
federally-delegated authority to regulate liquor within their
communities, promoted the very “self-determination” which was later
to become ANCSA’s touchstone. There is thus no conflict between the
policies the Venetie court found to be the underpinnings of ANCSA, and
the conclusion that Alaska Native Villages should be entitled to exercise
their federally-delegated authority over alcohol within their
communities.
Finally, Justice Thomas’s observation that “[w]hether the concept of
Indian country should be modified is a question entirely for
Congress”277 underscores the fact that, if Congress has modified the
concept of “Indian country” for purposes of the federal Indian liquor
laws by extending those laws to any particular parcel of “fee patented
land in a non-Indian community” through a statute so specifying, then
finding that fee-patented land to be Indian country for that limited
purpose would not only be compatible with the Venetie opinion, but in
fact binding on the United States Supreme Court as well as the lower
courts.
Nothing in the ruling or reasoning of the Court in Venetie should be
read to be inconsistent with the hypothesis that Alaska Native Villages
have a valid claim to occupy liquor-law-only FILL Indian country.
Before turning to the last section, it may be helpful to review.
“Indian country,” which the federal Indian liquor law statutes require
for tribes to exercise delegated federal authority to enact their own tribal
alcohol ordinances, can be created by a federal law extending the Indian
liquor laws to a particular piece of land. For Alaska Native Villages, the
275. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 734 (1983).
276. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 533, 534.
277. Id.
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Seveloff fix legislation, enacted in 1873 and not subsequently repealed,
should provide that prerequisite. It did not make the lands occupied by
Alaska Native Villages “full” Indian country, so it does not require any
reconsideration of the Venetie ruling; instead, it had the effect of making
those lands a limited type of “Indian country” for purposes of the Indian
liquor laws only. This may be of considerable benefit, not only to those
Alaska Native Villages wishing to exercise their authority to prevent,
through village ordinances and village enforcement, the myriad
problems which alcohol abuse has visited on their children and families,
but also to the State of Alaska which finds itself spending untold
amounts to remedy the problems created thereby.

IV. TODAY: CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNCILS
First and foremost, it is important to recognize that the existence of
tribal authority over liquor does not equate to a diminution of state
authority. Under the statutes enacted by Congress in 1953, liquor
transactions have to comply with both state law and tribal ordinances,
so the State continues to be able to enforce every aspect of state law. Rice
v. Rehner forecloses any argument that a liquor dealer could try to “hide
behind” a tribal ordinance as authorizing a liquor transaction
notwithstanding a state law prohibiting that transaction. Tribal
ordinances cannot exempt liquor transactions from state law (and vice
versa).
Second, it would likely be a mistake for tribal authorities to rely too
much on the possibility of federal criminal prosecutions as an
enforcement mechanism. History amply demonstrates that the federal
government is unwilling to provide the resources necessary to make this
happen. The practical advice Felix Cohen offered in 1941278 remains true:
tribes would be well-advised to fashion remedies that they can
implement themselves. The statute allows federal prosecutions for
violations of tribal ordinances only if those ordinances have been
published in the Federal Register, and there is no guarantee that the
Interior Department will be persuaded to publish. Even then, federal
prosecution may be able to play a backup role, but not a primary one.
Third, tribal ordinances need to adhere to the Indian Civil Rights
Act’s requirements.279 Due process requires notice and the opportunity
for a hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal. Equal protection

278. See Re the Intoxicating Liquor Traffic Among Natives in Alaska, supra
note 240.
279. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
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prohibits discrimination against particular groups.280 Tribes cannot
“violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue
warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized.”281
Fourth, Alaska Native Villages arguably have the authority under
section 20 of the 1834 Act “to take and destroy any ardent spirits or wine
found in the Indian country.”282 This was the tradition in many Alaska
Native Villages for years.283 It may still be the simplest and most
straightforward enforcement mechanism for Alaska’s Native Villages to
use. Tribal searches and seizures, while not subject to the provisions of
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, are, as noted above,
subject to the parallel provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act.284 But
tribal courts could issue those warrants, and a tribal government
exercising this authority would have the shield of its sovereign
immunity to protect it from attacks on those enforcement actions.
Fifth, criminal prosecution may not be a realistic enforcement
option for Alaska Native Villages to undertake on their own. Criminal
proceedings trigger an additional panoply of procedures and rights
under the Indian Civil Rights Act, which may make such proceedings
overly cumbersome and cost-ineffective for the tribe.285 Absent
Congressional authorization, it is black-letter law that tribes cannot

280. The equal protection clause would presumably allow the tribe to
distinguish between its members and non-members, see generally Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), but in this context, it would probably take the form
of allowing certain remedies against members violating the ordinance that
would not be available for imposition on non-members violating the ordinance.
281. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2), (a)(8).
282. 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (2012) (“Any . . . Indian may take and destroy any
ardent spirits or wine found in the Indian country, except such as are kept or
used for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes or such as
may be introduced therein by the Department of the Army”).
283. See Pat Hanley, Warrantless Searches for Alcohol by Native Alaskan Villages:
A Permissible Exercise of Sovereign Rights or an Assault on Civil Liberties?, 14
ALASKA L. REV. 471, 472 (1997) (“Several [Native American Villages] in
southwestern Alaska have set up stations at the village airplane runway in order
to search people and their luggage for alcohol before they are permitted to enter
their village”); ICHS study, supra note 1, at 68–69 (“Characteristics of continuous
law making and enforcement in these communities include some of the
following: . . . Illegal search, seizure, and destruction of alcohol from private
homes based on observed and reported possession and use . . . Some of the
means used by these communities are legitimized by community consensus, but
may be illegal because they violate the constitutional rights of residents.”).
284. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2).
285. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3), (4), (6), (7), (10).
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subject non-Natives to criminal prosecution,286 and in those instances
where Congress authorizes tribal criminal proceedings against nonNatives, there tend to be more rigorous safeguards and costly
prerequisites, perhaps unrealistic at present for many villages.287
Criminal jurisdiction is more likely to lead to jurisdictional challenges,
including the possibility of a federal habeas corpus action.288 Criminal
proceedings will probably be better left up to the discretion of state
prosecutors for violation of state law and federal prosecutors under the
federal Indian liquor laws. Civil remedies should be available with
respect to non-tribal members, given the clear threat that alcohol
presents to village health and welfare.289 Civil remedies may encompass
several types of remedies that may prove efficacious, including
forfeiture and/or destruction of alcohol, civil monetary penalties,
imposition of security bonds or other conditions to insure future
compliance, and civil exclusion remedies.
Sixth, tribal ordinances should be drafted to apply to well-defined
and limited geographic areas in the vicinity of the village being
protected. The federal Indian liquor laws were extended to Alaska “so
far as the same may be applicable thereto,”290 indicating Congress
intended there be some discretion, and some responsibility, to interpret
the law with a rule of reason. Villages should be careful not to overstep
their authority. Ordinances should protect the village area, and Councils
in drafting their ordinances will necessarily make choices about defining
that area, but they should be careful to tailor that scope to be no broader
than reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose. Tribal attempts to
regulate liquor sales in Anchorage or Fairbanks would exceed this limit
of reasonableness.
Seventh, Councils should understand the similarities and
distinctions between tribal ordinances and local option ordinances. Each
will be independently enforceable. Villages need not choose one over the
other; both may be in place in the same area, and then any liquor
transaction will have to remain in compliance with both sets of rules. For
some villages, if the local option ordinance is working well, there may
be no need to assert tribal authority. Other villages have found the local
option ordinances to be unsatisfactory for one reason or another.291 But
286. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
287. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012).
288. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
289. The Supreme Court has noted that the distribution and use of
intoxicants are clearly matters that affect the internal and social relations of tribal
life. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
290. See supra text accompanying note 88.
291. The shortcomings most often mentioned about Alaska’s local option
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the assertion of tribal authority need not entail rejecting the local option
ordinance. The two should be able to work together, and perhaps any
weak points in either can be ameliorated by the other.

CONCLUSION
The 1873 Seveloff fix extension of the Indian liquor laws to Alaska
was not repealed by Congress–-not by enactment of the Revised Statutes
in 1876, or the District Organic Act in 1884, or by the Carter Code in
1899, or by the Territorial Organic Act in 1912, or by the Bone Dry Law
in 1917, or by Assistant Commissioner Kirgis in 1937, or by the
amendments to the federal criminal code in 1948 or 1949, or by the
revision of the FILL in 1953, or the extension of P.L. 280 to Alaska in
1953, or by Statehood in 1959, or by ANCSA in 1971, or by the Venetie
decision in 1998. Unless and until Congress chooses to repeal it, it can
serve to provide Alaska Native Villages with a proper basis to exercise
the same sort of federally-delegated authority to regulate alcohol in their
immediate vicinities that their counterparts in the lower 48 have within
their reservations, allotments, and dependent Indian communities. The
federal, state and tribal governments should make use of the fact that
every federally recognized tribe in Alaska occupies a community to
which Congress extended the Indian liquor laws in 1873, giving each
village sufficient basis to enact tribal alcohol ordinances pursuant to the
federally-delegated authority Congress enacted in 1953.
ordinances include: some villages would like more flexibility than is afforded by
the limited menu of possible provisions to be included in the ordinance under
ALASKA STAT. § 04.11.491(b) (2012); some villages may wish to sanction
“possession by consumption” as well as possession in a container, compare
ALASKA STAT. § 04.11.501(d) (2012); some villages may wish to fashion their own
sanctions more aligned with their own village traditions; some villages have
concerns over the state penalties under the local option law, and/or wish to
impose a sanction without the offender getting a state court criminal record;
some villages want to implement timelier responses than state law enforcement
is able to supply. (Interview with Tanana Chiefs Conference Tribal Government
Specialist Lisa Jaeger, Mar. 14, 2015). In some areas, local option elections seem
to swing back and forth with a frequency that generates significant confusion.
See ICHS study, supra note 1, at 71.
None of this is to say that the local option ordinances are unhelpful. There
are many Alaskan children and Alaskan families that have benefitted from the
safer and healthier living environment in a community without alcohol.
“Although growing evidence suggests that the local option law may reduce
adverse effects of alcohol abuse in Alaska Native communities, its most
important contribution may be to restore to these communities a limited form of
self-government.” Matthew Berman & Teresa Hull, Alcohol Control by Referendum
in Northern Native Communities: the Alaska Local Option Law 1, 2, U. OF ALASKA
ANCHORAGE INST. OF SOC. AND ECON. RESEARCH, Aug. 2000, available at
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/Alcohol_Arctic.pdf.
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Justice Thomas’s closing observation in the Venetie opinion that
“[w]hether the concept of Indian country should be modified is a
question entirely for Congress”292 unconsciously echoed the observation
made by Judge Matthew Deady over 100 years earlier that “[i]f congress
should think it desirable that this or any other provision of the Indian
intercourse act should be in force in Alaska, it can so provide, beyond
doubt.”293 Congress did so provide, and Judge Deady, to his credit,
recognized that it had. Hopefully, contemporary courts will recognize
the significance of this unrepealed provision as a legal foundation from
which the State of Alaska and its resident Tribes can collaboratively
exercise their shared delegated jurisdiction. A strong village
enforcement stance against illegal alcohol importation could be a
valuable ally with, and effective supplement to, strong state enforcement
of state and local option laws. The State of Alaska, for all of its resistance
to tribal self-rule policies in other contexts, has not attacked tribal efforts
to regulate alcohol. That tradition is one that ought to be maintained.294

292. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 534 (1998).
293. United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021, 1024 (D. Or. 1872) (No. 16,252).
294. See United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 198
(1876) (“Minnesota, instead of being injured, is benefited. An immense tract of
valuable country formerly withheld from her civil jurisdiction is subjected to it,
and her wealth and power greatly increased. . . . It would seem, apart from the
question of power, that the price paid by the State bears no proportion to the
substantial and enduring benefits conferred upon her; and we are happy to say,
that her officers are not engaged in making this defence [sic].”).

